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Abstract
We study optimal savings policies when there is a dual concern about under-saving for re-
tirement and income inequality. Agents differ in time preferences and earnings ability, both
unobservable to a planner with paternalistic and redistributive motives. We characterize the
solution to this two-dimensional screening problem and provide a decentralization using re-
alistic policy instruments: forced savings at low incomes—similar to Social Security—but a
choice between savings accounts with different subsidies and caps at high incomes—like 401(k)
and IRA accounts in the US. Offering more choice in savings at higher incomes facilitates re-
distribution. Relative to the current US retirement system, we find large welfare gains from
increasing mandatory savings and limiting savings choice at low incomes.
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1 Introduction
A shared feature of many modern welfare states is limited choice in savings for retirement.1 These
systems commonly force contributions toward old-age benefits on the basis of a paternalistic mo-
tive to induce adequate savings for retirement, particularly among low-income groups (Diamond,
1977; Kotlikoff et al., 1982; Feldstein, 1985). Rationales for the paternalistic motive derive both
from the behavioral sciences and also from a purely neoclassical economics tradition. On one
hand, individuals may make mistakes when choosing under incomplete information and uncer-
tainty (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), or they may suffer from time-inconsistent decision making
over the life-cycle (Laibson, 1997). On the other hand, altruism and lack of government commit-
ment give rise to an externality problem labeled the Samaritan’s Dilemma, leading individuals to
rationally under-save in anticipation of free-riding on public funds during retirement (Buchanan,
1975; Prescott, 2004; Sleet and Yeltekin, 2006). In both environments, individuals’ preferences are
characterized by present bias and paternalistic savings policies may be welfare-improving.
We study optimal retirement savings policies when there is a paternalistic motive to overcome
individuals’ present bias problems. The central question we ask is: how much choice in savings
should be optimally offered throughout the income distribution? To address this question, we
integrate a paternalistic savings motive into an optimal taxation framework, allowing us to study
the problem of savings adequacy jointly with the issue of income inequality. Our key insight is
that there exists a trade-off between paternalism and redistribution. As a result, the optimal policy
enforces high savings rates at low incomes but offers a choice between various subsidized savings
options at high incomes. Qualitatively, the optimal policies in our framework resemble many
real-world retirement savings systems, including Social Security and various subsidized savings
accounts in the US. Quantitatively, however, we find large welfare gains relative to current US
policies from increasing mandatory savings and limiting savings choice at low incomes.
In our theoretical framework, the interaction between two ingredients gives rise to a novel
trade-off in optimal savings policy design. The first ingredient, motivated by recent experimental
evidence (Montiel Olea and Strzalecki, 2014), is heterogeneity in individuals’ present bias. The
1Government-mandated old-age benefits were administered in ancient Rome to prevent revolts by impoverished
army veterans (Choi, 2015). In the modern world, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck instituted the Old Age and
Disability Insurance Law of 1889 to guarantee adequate incomes for retired workers (Kotlikoff, 1996). The US Old-
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance program, or Social Security in short, signed into law in 1935 under President
Roosevelt to ameliorate the extent of poverty among retirees, is nowadays the nation’s largest federal government social
policy, with 884 billion US dollars in transfers to 60 million beneficiaries in 2016 (Social Security Administration, 2017).
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second ingredient is heterogeneity in earnings ability as in Mirrlees (1971), Diamond (1998), and
Saez (2001). A paternalistic and redistributive planner defines the efficient savings rate accord-
ing to a single time preference and attaches different welfare weights across ability types.2 The
planner picks a consumption and labor allocation to maximize welfare subject to incentive com-
patibility and a resource constraint. The theoretical analysis of this problem is complex since, as
is well known, multi-dimensional screening problems lead to failure of the first-order approach
that the optimal taxation literature usually relies on (Golosov et al., 2003, 2016). We exploit the
paternalistic formulation to provide a partial characterization of this problem under weak regu-
larity conditions. Our main theoretical result highlights the trade-off between paternalism and
redistribution in the second-best economy: low-ability agents are bunched at an inefficiently high
savings rate, while high-ability agents are separated by time preferences at lower savings rates.
Intuitively, the planner offers choice in savings as a carrot and stick to incentivize work effort at
high ability levels, thereby facilitating redistribution.
This theoretical characterization is useful because the optimal allocation can be decentralized
as a competitive equilibrium given three realistic policy instruments: first, mandated old-age ben-
efits as a function of income; second, a finite number of retirement accounts with different income-
dependent subsidy rates and contribution limits; and third, a non-linear labor income tax. Intu-
itively, for high enough forced savings, low-income as well as impatient high-income agents will
be constrained and rely only on mandated old-age benefits, whereas more patient high-income
agents choose to sequentially exhaust the limits on subsidized retirement accounts. Qualitatively,
this set of policy instruments resembles real-world retirement savings systems, such as Social Se-
curity plus 401(k) and various individual retirement arrangement (IRA) accounts in the US.
We apply this framework to quantitatively study the current US retirement savings and tax-
transfer system vis-à-vis optimal policies in our model. This is a non-trivial task because failure
of the linear independence constraint qualification in multi-dimensional screening problems ren-
ders numerical optimization routines unstable (Judd and Su, 2006). To overcome this problem,
we develop a broadly applicable algorithm that efficiently solves high-dimensional non-linear op-
timization problems by finding the smallest set of binding constraints at the optimum. We first
calibrate a positive version of our model to infer the joint distribution of time preferences and earn-
2That the planner respects a single time preference can be motivated by adopting an individual’s perspective before
the realization of a present bias shock, as in Amador et al. (2006). That welfare weights depend only on ability reflects
a desire for income redistribution or insurance across ability types independent from the present bias shock.
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ings ability using microdata on life-cycle income and wealth accumulation from the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS). Identification of individual
preference heterogeneity comes from differences in wealth at retirement conditional on life-time
income. We then use our algorithm to solve the normative model and recover social preferences
by extending the inverse-optimum approach (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2012) to our setting. Fi-
nally, we combine the normative model with the inferred worker type distribution and social
preferences in order to analyze optimal savings policies and quantify welfare gains from reforms
to the current US system.
We present three main results from our quantitative analysis. First, we find substantial em-
pirical heterogeneity in present bias and hence in implied optimal savings rates throughout the
income distribution. Our calibration recovers annualized discount rates ranging from 0.905 to
0.999 between the 10th and the 90th percentile of the distribution, and a mild positive correlation
of 0.10 between discount rates and income. In spite of this heterogeneity, the optimal savings rate
at the bottom of the income distribution is uniformly set to 20 percent, even though the first-best
rate is around to 16.5 percent. In contrast, savings rates for individuals earning USD 200,000 vary
substantially between 15 and 21 percent.
Second, we discuss welfare implications of reforms to the current US savings and tax system as
we uncover a tension between its two components. On one hand, the US tax-transfer system is best
justified through welfare weights that are less redistributive than utilitarian (i.e. put more weight
on high ability levels). On the other hand, our model rationalizes the large dispersion in savings
rates at high incomes in the US as welfare weights that are more redistributive than utilitarian (i.e.
put more weight on low ability levels). This is because the only reason a planner offers choice in
savings is to facilitate redistribution. Hence, the current system is off the Pareto frontier, with 17.5
percent of consumption-equivalent welfare gains available from increasing mandatory savings
and limiting savings choice, particularly at low incomes.
Third, we discuss implications for optimal savings instruments in our decentralization. Opti-
mal contribution limits on retirement accounts are approximately affine in earnings. Individuals
with annual incomes up to USD 65,000 receive only Social Security payments. Above that thresh-
old, optimal savings vehicles include a “subsidized account” with a contribution limit of 1.8 per-
cent of income, and a “tax-preferred account” with a limit of 3.7 percent. Further accounts have
caps close to zero. Hence, a small number of accounts is sufficient to approximate the optimal
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savings schedule. Optimal subsidy rates on retirement accounts in our decentralization are pro-
gressive. The “subsidized account” features a 30 percent subsidy that phases out to zero at around
USD 15,000 in annual income before steadily increasing to a 25 percent tax rate at USD 200,000 in
earnings. The second “tax-preferred account” is taxed at a rate that increases from 20 to 40 percent
over the same income range. Finally, the tax on a regular savings account without cap is optimally
set to approximately 45 percent.
Our main insight is more general than the application to savings policies. We characterize
optimal choice architecture across income groups when private and social preferences disagree
and tax revenues are valued. This formulation nests many behavioral and neoclassical problems.
We discuss implications for Pigouvian taxation and quantity restrictions in their context.
Related literature. This paper contributes to three strands of the literature.3 The first strand is
concerned with the optimal taxation of capital. The classical result by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972)
implies that with agreement in preferences between the planner and agents only income, but not
savings, should be distorted for redistributive purposes. Also relying on preference agreement is
the zero long-run capital taxation proposition by Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986), subsequently
revisited by Atkeson et al. (1999), Lansing (1999), Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), Hassler et al. (2008),
Saez (2013), and Straub and Werning (2014). In our framework, paternalism provides an alterna-
tive motive for capital taxes or subsidies. Closely related to our work, Saez (2002), Diamond and
Spinnewijn (2011), and Golosov et al. (2013) consider heterogeneous time preferences without pa-
ternalism and show that the correlation between discount factors and earnings ability matters for
the optimal degree of capital taxation. Hosseini and Shourideh (2017) study optimal retirement
policy reforms with heterogeneous mortality rates and time preferences. Relative to their work,
a novel aspect of our paper is to consider the interaction between paternalism and redistribution
with heterogeneity in both time preferences and earnings ability. In this setting, we find that the
optimal dispersion of marginal capital tax rates is larger at high incomes.
The second literature that we relate to is the field of behavioral public finance, much of which
has focused on optimal taxation without heterogeneity in behavioral biases and redistribution.
For instance, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003, 2006) and Gruber and Köszegi (2004) consider the in-
cidence of linear consumption taxes when certain goods are either over-consumed (e.g. cigarettes)
3In Section 2.4, we further discuss our theoretical findings in light of some of the most related results in the literature.
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or under-consumed (e.g. retirement savings). Farhi and Werning (2007, 2010), Pavoni and Yazici
(2016), and Phelan and Rustichini (2016) study optimal estate taxation in a model with a single
level of present bias. Lockwood and Taubinsky (2017) allow for non-linear labor earnings taxes
and a linear tax on the “sin good.” Amador et al. (2006) study an optimal delegation problem with
a common level of present bias and find a minimum savings rule to be optimal.4 In related work,
Chetty et al. (2009), Beshears et al. (2015), and Farhi and Gabaix (2015) consider optimal policy
design in the presence of behavioral agents but without redistribution. By allowing for transfers
in such an environment, we highlight a novel trade-off due to the interaction between paternalism
and redistribution. As a result, the optimal policy features over-saving at low incomes and dif-
ferentially distorted savings decisions at high incomes. Our paper also complements recent work
by Yu (2016) and Lockwood (2016), who focus on implications of present bias for income taxation
under a redistributive motive. In contrast, our focus is on characterizing optimal savings policies.
The third strand of related work studies multi-dimensional screening problems. Rochet (1987),
McAfee and McMillan (1988), Armstrong (1996), Rochet and Choné (1998), and Armstrong and
Rochet (1999) emphasize challenges in the analysis of optimal contracts with higher-dimensional
unobserved heterogeneity. Some important contributions in the public finance have made further
progress in this field. Kleven et al. (2009) analyze the optimal taxation of couples, while Rothschild
and Scheuer (2013, 2015, 2016) characterize optimal income taxes under multi-dimensional skill
heterogeneity. We contribute to this literature in two ways. First, we provide a partial characteriza-
tion of the solution to a two-dimensional screening problem under the assumption of paternalism.
Second, we develop a numerical algorithm that efficiently solves more general two-dimensional
screening problems, making it potentially useful in a variety of other applications.
Outline. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the optimal savings problem
with two-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity. Section 3 provides a decentralization of the opti-
mal allocation using realistic policy instruments. Section 4 describes the numerical algorithm used
to solve the model and calibrates it to US microdata in order to evaluate current retirement sav-
ings and tax policies. Section 5 generalizes our main theoretical result and discusses applications
to behavioral and neoclassical problems. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
4Similar setups have been studied in the context of monetary policy (Athey et al., 2005), sovereign debt dynamics
(Aguiar and Amador, 2011), fiscal rules (Halac and Yared, 2014), the market for commitment devices (Galperti, 2015),
and parent-child relations (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2017).
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2 Characterizing optimal paternalistic savings policies
2.1 Model setup
This section presents our benchmark model for the analysis of optimal savings policies when
there is a dual concern about under-saving for retirement and income inequality. We present a
two-period life-cycle model with two-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity in present bias and
earnings ability.5 Following the optimal taxation literature, we characterize the second-best alloca-
tion of resources in a mechanism design formulation of the problem without restricting ourselves
to a any specific policy instruments.
A unit mass of agents live for two periods indexed by t, work and retirement, with common
discount rate δ. Agents differ in two unobservable attributes. The first attribute is earnings ability,
denoted θ ∈ Θ = {θ1, . . . , θN}, where 0 ≤ θ1 < . . . < θN < +∞. The second attribute is the degree
of present bias, denoted β ∈ B = {β1, . . . , βM} where 0 < β1 < . . . < βM = 1.6 We understand β as
a reduced-form placeholder for the disagreement between the planner and agents at the time of
the savings decision, which may arise from a behavioral bias (Laibson, 1997) or from an externality
problem absent government commitment (Sleet and Yeltekin, 2006). We do not impose restrictions
on the distribution over agents’ types, pi (θ, β), other than assuming full support. In particular, our
analysis does not rely on any particular correlation between θ and β.
Utility is defined over consumption ct for t = 1, 2 and income y. The planner evaluates experi-
enced utility of type (θ, β) according to
V (c1, c2, y; θ) = u (c1)− v (y)
θ
+ δu (c2)
where u′ (·) > 0, u′ (0) = +∞, u′′ (·) < 0 and v (0) = 0, v′ (0) = 0, v′ (·) , v′′ (·) > 0 for c1, c2, y ≥ 0.
Note that V (c1, c2, y; ·) does not directly depend on β. At the time of choosing their savings,
however, agents evaluate decision utility according to
U (c1, c2, y; θ, β) = u (c1)− v (y)
θ
+ βδu (c2)
5The essence of our theory is conveyed in a simple two-period model. In Appendix B, we characterize a multi-period
life-cycle model with heterogeneity in hyperbolic discount factors.
6In our quantitative analysis in Section 4, we relax the assumption of β ≤ 1 when estimating the distribution of
present bias from microdata on life-time income and wealth accumulation. Furthermore, Section 5 presents a general-
ized model that allows for both excessive and insufficient action-taking.
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Our preferred interpretation of this setup is that agents and the planner share a common evalua-
tion of utility at time 0, but disagreement arises at time 1 due to heterogeneous degrees of present
bias captured by the additional discount factor β (Amador et al., 2006). Finally, a storage technol-
ogy transfers resources between periods at gross rate of return R.
Following Mirrlees (1971), we assume that the planner observes consumption and labor in-
come but not agents’ types directly, and designs the game to be played by agents in the econ-
omy. Although this game could take an arbitrary form, the Revelation Principle guarantees that
it is sufficient to consider incentive compatible direct mechanisms, in which agents’ payoffs de-
pend only on their reported type. We call such this assignment rule an allocation and denote it
A = {c1 (θ, β) , c2 (θ, β) , y (θ, β)}(θ,β)∈Θ×B. We characterize properties of the optimal allocation
before showing how it can be decentralized using a set of realistic policy instruments.
An allocation satisfies incentive compatibility (IC) if using agents’ decision utility we have
(θ, β) = arg max
(θ′,β′)
U
(
c1
(
θ′, β′
)
, c2
(
θ′, β′
)
, y
(
θ′, β′
)
; θ, β
) ∀ (θ, β) ∈ Θ× B (1)
An incentive compatible allocation can be implemented with agents truthfully reporting their
types as an equilibrium strategy in the direct mechanism. An allocation is feasible if it satisfies
∑
(θ,β)∈Θ×B
pi (θ, β)
[
y (θ, β)− c1 (θ, β)− c2 (θ, β)R
]
≥ 0 (2)
A feasible allocation allows for transfers across types but restricts the planner’s net budget balance
to be weakly positive. We define welfare as agents’ experienced utilities aggregated as
W
(
{c1 (θ, β) , c2 (θ, β) , y (θ, β)}(θ,β)∈Θ×B
)
= ∑
(θ,β)∈Θ×B
pi (θ, β) λ (θ)V (θ, β) (3)
where λ (θ) ≥ 0 are Pareto weights, normalized such that ∑θ,β pi (θ, β) λ (θ) = 1. Consistent with
our interpretation of paternalism, we assume welfare weights depend only on θ but not on β. In
this environment, we define efficiency with respect to the planner’s preference.
Definition 1. Given Pareto weights {λ (θ)}θ∈Θ, the planner’s problem is to choose a second-best
or constrained efficient allocationA∗∗ that maximizes welfare (3) subject to IC (1) and feasibility (2).
We say an allocation A∗ is first-best or efficient if it maximizes welfare (3) subject to feasibility (2).
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2.2 Example with 2× 2 types
It is instructive to illustrate the model mechanics in a simple environment. Assume for now two
levels of earnings ability and two levels of present bias. For simplicity, let β ∈ {βL, βH} with
βL < βH = 1, let θ ∈ {θL, θH} with 0 = θL < θH, set Rδ = 1, and suppose the planner is weakly
more redistributive than utilitarian, λ (θL) ≥ λ (θH).7 Clearly, the first-best allocation features
savings at a rate satisfying the planner’s Euler equation, which implies c1 = c2, independent of β.
We proceed step-wise in providing a full characterization of the second-best allocation.
Bunching at low ability. Because present bias levels do not enter the planner’s objective, the
first-best allocation treats identically agents with common θ but different β. As u′ (0) = +∞ and
high-ability agents can work while low-ability individuals cannot, only the former has strictly
positive labor income. Since income is observable, low-ability agents cannot pretend to work
and hence the relevant IC constraints in θ-space are the ones from high ability to low ability:
u (c1 (θH, β))− v (y1 (θH, β)) /θH + βδu (c2 (θH, β)) ≥ u (c1 (θL, β′)) + βδu (c2 (θL, β′)) for levels of
present bias β, β′ ∈ {βL, βH}. Assigning average utilities to low-ability agents trivially preserves
IC among them. Because the the previous IC constraint is linear in utility levels u (c1 (θL, β′))
and u (c2 (θL, β′)) on the right-hand side, this also preserves IC between high and low ability lev-
els: u (c1 (θH, β))− v (y1 (θH, β)) /θH + βδu (c2 (θH, β)) ≥ u¯1 (θL) + βδu¯2 (θL) for β, β′ ∈ {βL, βH},
where u¯t (θL) = ∑β′ pi (β′| θL) u (ct (θL, β′)). Therefore, it is incentive compatible for the planner to
allocate c¯t (θL) = u−1 (u¯t (θL)) to all low-ability agents. Furthermore, this perturbation leaves wel-
fare unchanged. However, strict concavity of u implies that such an allocation is strictly less costly,
c¯1 (θL) + c¯2 (θL) /R < ∑β′ pi (β′| θL) [c1 (θL, β′) + c2 (θL, β′) /R] whenever ct (θL, βL) 6= ct (θL, βH)
for some t ∈ {0, 1}.
In summary, offering the same allocation to low-ability types preserves IC, leaves welfare un-
changed, but saves resources. We conclude that the planner optimally bunches low-ability agents:
(c1 (θL, β) , c2 (θL, β)) = (c1 (θL) , c2 (θL)) for β ∈ {βL, βH}.
Separation at high ability. Should high-ability agents also be bunched? By way of contradiction,
suppose that (c1 (θH, β) , c2 (θH, β) , y (θH, β)) = (c1 (θH) , c2 (θH) , y (θH)) for β ∈ {βL, βH}. There
are two cases to consider.
7With θL = 0 we mean the limiting case of low-ability agents not working, yL = 0, and their disutility from work
being v (0) /0 = 0 by L’Hôpital’s rule.
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In the first case, high-ability agents are bunched with c1 (θH) > c2 (θH), illustrated as point A in
Figure 1(a). At this point, the indifference curve of βL-types is steeper as impatient types require
relatively more period 2 consumption to compensate a given change in period 1 consumption.
While continuing to offer allocation A, the planner can target patient agents by offering allocation
B. Since points on the 45-degree-line minimize the cost of providing a given utility level, alloca-
tion B lies in the interior of the budget set. At high ability, βH-types are indifferent between the
allocations, while βL-types strictly prefer A over B. In summary, offering allocation B in addition
to allocation A preserves IC, leaves welfare unchanged, but saves resources—a contradiction.
In the second case, high-ability agents are bunched with c2 (θH) ≥ c1 (θH). Clearly, allocations
with c2 (θH) > c1 (θH) are dominated by one with c2 (θH) = c1 (θH), illustrated as point D in
Figure 1(b). By offering an additional allocation E with higher period 1 consumption, the planner
can target impatient agents. Moving them toward this allocation, their IC constraints become slack
and welfare decreases. In the second-best solution, the planner can then make (θH, βL)-types work
more and use those extra resources for redistribution while preserving IC. The first-order welfare
gain from transfers to θL-types strictly exceeds the second-order welfare loss from allowing the
deviation by (θH, βL)-types whenever allocations D and E are close enough. In summary, this
perturbation improves welfare while preserving IC and feasibility—a contradiction.
Combining both cases, we conclude that high-ability types are optimally separated by present
bias: (c1 (θH, βL) , c2 (θH, βL)) 6= (c1 (θH, βH) , c2 (θH, βH)).8
Implied savings rates. Low-ability agents must be bunched such that c2 (θL) ≥ c1 (θL), or else
moving them from point A to B in Figure 1(a) would leave welfare unchanged, preserve IC, but
save resources. Suppose now that c2 (θL) = c1 (θL), shown as point F in Figure 1(c). A similar
argument as before shows that moving low-ability types in the direction of point G induces a
second-order welfare loss but relaxes the IC constraint of (θH, βL)-types to a first order, enabling
net welfare gains from increased redistribution. It follows that the second-best solution to the
planner’s problem features c2 (θL) > c1 (θL).
Inspection of Figure 1(a) also establishes that c2 (θH, βH) ≥ c1 (θH, βH) must be optimal. Fur-
8All θH-types optimally have the same earnings. To see this, by way of contradiction and without loss of generality
suppose that y (θH , βL) < y (θH , βH). Then one could offer y (θH) = ∑β′ pi ( β′| θL) u (ct (θH , β′)) to both θH-types,
keeping resources constant. Due to convexity of v, (θH , βL)-types can be compensated for working more by transferring
resources to them from (θH , βH)-types in a way to keep her welfare at the previous level, while saving resources—a
contradiction. Hence, high-ability types share the same income: y (θH , β) = y (θH , β) = y (θH) for β ∈ {βL, βH}.
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thermore, the only reason the planner would distort savings of (θH, βH)-types is if their allocation
were envied by (θH, βL)-types. In Appendix A.1, we show that this cannot be the case and dis-
cuss relevant IC constraints at the solution to this problem. We conclude that savings of patient
high-ability agents are optimally undistorted, c1 (θH, βH) = c2 (θH, βH). Together with our ear-
lier result on separation at high ability, this implies that (θH, βL)-types in period 1 are allowed to
over-consume, c1 (θH, βL) > c2 (θH, βL).
Summary. Intuitively, the planner offers choice as a screening device to identify high-ability
types. At low ability, enforcing uniform savings is costless and setting the rate above the efficient
level deters deviations by impatient high-ability types pretending to have low ability. At high
ability, the cost of enforcing a given savings rate varies with individual levels of present bias.
Consequently, savings by patient high-ability types are optimally left undistorted, while impatient
high-ability types are allowed to over-consume in period 1.
Figure 1. Consumption perturbations
(a) Separation at high ability, case 1 (b) Separation at high ability, case 2 (c) Over-saving at low ability
2.3 General results
We now turn back to our benchmark model with more general heterogeneity in earnings ability
and present bias. The usual approach in one-dimensional screening problems is to rely on the
Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition and a monotonicity property of allocations in types to
reduce the set of relevant IC constraints to only local constraints between bordering types. It is
well-known that this approach does not extend to problems with multi-dimensional types (Rochet
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and Stole, 2003; Battaglini and Lamba, 2015). We exploit the paternalistic formulation to provide
a partial characterization of this problem for the top and bottom of the ability distribution.9
Bunching and separation. Our main result characterizes the extent to which the optimal alloca-
tion differentiates between different β-types throughout the ability distribution given a utilitarian
or more redistributive planner.
Theorem 1. Assume λ′ (θ) ≤ 0 and fix {θ2, . . . , θN−1}. Then there exist scalars θ > 0 and θ < +∞ such
that at the solution to the planner’s problem:
1. If θ1 < θ, then all types {(θ1, β) : β ∈ B} are bunched, i.e. for t = 1, 2 and all β ∈ B:
(ct (θ1, β) , y (θ1, β)) = (ct (θ1) , y (θ1))
2. If θN > θ, then types {(θN , β) : β ∈ B} are separated in their consumption, i.e. for some β, β′ ∈ B:
(c1 (θN , β) , c2 (θN , β)) 6=
(
c1
(
θN , β′
)
, c2
(
θN , β′
))
Proof. See Appendix A.2.3.
Intuitively, there is non-trivial interaction between heterogeneity in present bias and the redis-
tributive motive. On one hand, the planner wants agents to save at a uniform rate given by the
planner’s Euler equation, u′ (c1 (θ, β)) = Rδu′ (c2 (θ, β)). On the other hand, the planner wants
to tailor consumption and labor allocations to each high-ability type separately so as to maximize
redistribution toward lower ability types, which is valued under a redistributive motive.
The first part of Theorem 1 states that the planner finds it optimal to bunch the lowest-ability
types regardless of their present bias level β. Clearly, such bunching is a feature of the first-
best allocation. What we show is that at low enough ability levels it is approximately costless to
enforce this feature, as the disutility of labor makes it costly for these agents to deviate toward
higher ability levels. Since low-ability types are net transfer recipients the planner can enforce
9The assumption of a paternalistic planner reduces the dimensionality of the objective function—but not of the IC
and feasibility constraints—and allows for a partial characterization of the solution to the planner’s problem. Using
numerical methods, we confirm in section 4 that those properties extend to the interior of the ability distribution.
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an arbitrary savings level as long as this preserves higher ability types’ downward-binding IC
constraints. Consequently, bunching is optimal at the bottom of the ability distribution.10
The second part of Theorem 1 states that the highest-ability types are optimally separated
across present bias levels β. From the agents’ points of view, disagreement in time preferences be-
tween each other and with the planner imply differential distortions given any one allocation for
those types. Although the planner would like them to adhere to the same consumption-savings
schedule, at high ability levels the welfare gain from enforcing uniform savings is outweighed
by the resource cost from lower output as a result of savings distortions. Instead, the planner
can extract more resources from the highest-ability types when their downward-binding IC con-
straints are relaxed by offering savings options tailored to their individual levels of present bias.
Given that Pareto weights are decreasing in ability, this can improve welfare by transferring ex-
tra resources toward lower ability types. As a result, the planner optimally allows for different
allocations among the highest-ability types to facilitate redistribution.
Optimal savings distortions. We now characterize the nature of optimal savings distortions. To
this end, it is useful to define two wedges that represent distortions at the solution to the planner’s
problem. First, we define the decision wedge to capture distortions in agents’ view:
τD (θ, β) = 1− u
′ (c1 (θ, β))
Rβδu′ (c2 (θ, β))
The decision wedge captures deviations from agents’ Euler equations relating consumption be-
tween periods 1 and 2. Under laissez-faire, agents would choose their preferred savings rate and
τD (θ, β) = 0. A negative decision wedge is akin to a positive implied tax on current consumption,
which is associated with a higher savings rate than agents would pick in laissez-faire. Note that
for any given allocation, the decision wedge differs across β-types.
Second, we define the efficiency wedge to capture distortions in the planner’s view:
τE (θ, β) = 1− u
′ (c1 (θ, β))
Rδu′ (c2 (θ, β))
The efficiency wedge measures deviations from the planner’s Euler equation and thus the wel-
10In Appendix B, we present an interpretation of β as a hyperbolic discount factor in a dynamic environment and
show that the planner optimally provides full insurance to lowest-ability types against their future time inconsistency.
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fare losses relative to the efficient marginal rate of substitution. The first-best economy features
τE (θ, β) = 0 for all types. A positive efficiency wedge means that agents over-consume in period
1 relative to period 2 when compared to the first-best savings rate. The decision wedge coincides
with the efficiency wedge for β = 1. For all other β-types we have τD (θ, β) < τE (θ, β), indicating
that the planner wants agents to save at a higher rate for all β < 1.
By signing decision wedges and efficiency wedges across types at the solution to the planner’s
problem, we learn about the nature of distortions and inefficiencies that characterize the second-
best allocation. The following result provides such a characterization given a utilitarian or more
redistributive planner.
Theorem 2. Assume λ′ (θ) ≤ 0 and fix {θ2, . . . , θN−1}. Then there exist scalars θ > 0 and θ < +∞ such
that at the solution to the planner’s problem:
1. If θ1 < θ, then:
• τD (θ1, β) < 0 for β < 1 and τD (θ1, βM) ≤ 0;
• τE (θ1, β) = τE (θ1) ≤ 0 for all β;
2. If θN > θ, then:
• τD (θN , βM) = τE (θN , βM) ≤ 0;
• τE (θN , β1) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.4.
Intuitively, Theorem 2 shows that savings distortions optimally vary throughout the income
distribution. The interaction between paternalism and redistribution is again key to understand-
ing this result. Dispersion in savings distortions is optimally used as an additional screening
device when there is present bias heterogeneity. While the planner would like to correct sav-
ings throughout the ability distribution, a given savings distortion is more costly at higher ability
levels. Thus the trade-off between paternalism and redistribution determines optimal decision
wedges and efficiency wedges throughout ability distribution.
The first part of Theorem 2 states that the lowest-ability types experience an implied savings
subsidy that is strictly positive for all β-types except for the most patient type whose subsidy
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is weakly positive.11 Furthermore, these implied savings subsidies are strong enough to move
the lowest-ability types weakly above the first-best savings rate. As in our example with 2× 2
types, the planner optimally uses high savings at the bottom as a screening device to encourage
work effort at higher ability levels. This is optimal because the associated welfare costs from
such distortions are of second-order while they relax downward-binding IC constraints to a first
order. Furthermore, at low enough ability levels, the welfare gains from enforcing a high savings
rate outweigh the resource cost of discouraging work effort at these levels. Consequently, a high
savings rate is optimal among low-ability types.
The second part of Theorem 2 shows that top-ability types’ savings rates vary between the
planner’s and agents’ preferred rates. Agents with β < 1 face a strictly positive implied savings
subsidy, while the implied subsidy for the most patient type is weakly positive. Along our previ-
ous intuition, the planner cares about correcting all agents’ savings decisions, hence induces them
to save more than they would in laissez-faire. But bringing their savings up to the efficient level
is too costly, hence a strictly positive efficiency wedge remains for all but the most patient agent,
whose efficiency wedge is weakly positive. For high ability levels, welfare losses due to inefficient
savings are outweighed by the additional resources extracted from them as their IC constraints
with respect to low ability types are relaxed. As a result, the planner optimally allows some of the
top-ability types to save less than the first-best rate, though more than their preferred rate.
2.4 Comparison to most related results in the literature
We have argued that our main theoretical results arise from the interaction between present bias
heterogeneity and the redistributive motive. To understand the forces in our model, it is instruc-
tive to relate our model to three influential results in the literature.
First, the intermediate goods taxation result of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) states that in a
static environment without preference disagreement, intertemporal consumption decisions op-
timally remain undistorted even in the presence of a redistributive motive. Their result can be
illustrated in our simple example with 2× 2 types and β = 1 for all agents. In that model, the
only dimension of heterogeneity is the level of earnings ability θ ∈ {θL, θH} where θL = 0 < θH.
The only relevant IC constraint is then u (c1 (θH))− v (y (θH)) /θH + δu (c2 (θH)) ≥ u (c1 (θL)) +
11In numerical simulations, we find a strictly positive decision wedge for (θ1, βM)-types and a strictly positive effi-
ciency wedge for all (θ1, β)-types to be robust features of the solution to the planner’s problem.
15
δu (c2 (θL)). Since everyone agrees on the value of consumption over time, we can rewrite the
planner’s problem in its dual form as a resource cost minimization problem for each ability type:
minc1,c2
{
c1 + 1R c2
}
s.t. u (c1) + δu (c2) = U¯ (θ), where U¯ (θ) depends on the optimal transfers
across ability types taking into account IC. Taking first-order conditions of the above problem, we
get u′ (c1 (θ)) = Rδu′ (c1 (θ)) and therefore τD (θL) = τD (θH) = τE (θL) = τE (θH) = 0. Hence,
redistribution without paternalism leads to undistorted savings.12
The second related result is that of Farhi and Werning (2010) who find the optimal efficiency
wedge is monotonically increasing in ability under redistribution and a constant level of present
bias. Their environment resembles our example with βL = βH = β < 1 and θ ∈ {θL, θH} where
θL = 0 < θH. The IC constraint is then u (c1 (θH))− v (y (θH)) /θH + βδu (c2 (θH)) ≥ u (c1 (θL)) +
βδu (c2 (θL)). Given λ (θL) ≥ λ (θH) and 0 = y (θL) < y (θH), the IC constraint must bind at
the solution, so the planner would like to redistribute more toward θL-types. The planner can
improve upon the efficient savings rate by increasing θL-types’ savings rate and decreasing type
θH-types’ savings rate. Both perturbations incur a second-order welfare loss but strictly relax the
IC constraint, which facilitates redistribution and leads to a first-order net welfare gain. As a
result, at the optimum, θL-type agents strictly over-save, τE (θL) < 0, while θH-type agents strictly
under-save, τE (θH) > 0. Hence, the interaction between redistribution and a constant degree of
paternalism gives rise to efficiency wedges that are strictly increasing in ability.
Third, the result in Amador et al. (2006) in a model without redistribution but with hetero-
geneity in present bias is also relevant to our analysis. They find that the optimal policy in this
environment takes the form of a minimum savings threshold, which leaves patient agents’ savings
undistorted. Although for different reasons, the optimal policy emerging from our framework
also entails greater dispersion in savings at higher ability levels. A unique feature of our environ-
ment relative to theirs is that at low ability bunching occurs above the first-best savings rate, while
implied savings rates are differentially distorted at high ability.
Our model combines the two ingredients of redistribution and present bias heterogeneity. The
forces in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972), Farhi and Werning (2010), and Amador et al. (2006) are
also present in our model and partially characterized by Theorems 1 and 2. As in Atkinson and
12Savings may of course be distorted for other reasons not present in our benchmark model, such as insurance in an
incomplete markets environment with uninsurable income risk (Golosov et al., 2007). In Appendix B, we consider such
a dynamic environment and extend our main results to this setting. The main insight emerging from this analysis is
that the planner’s inverse Euler equation replaces the static Euler equation in our formulation above.
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Stiglitz (1972), the savings of (θN , βM)-types are undistorted. As in Farhi and Werning (2010),
the efficiency wedge is decreasing in ability. And as in Amador et al. (2006), low-ability types
are optimally bunched regardless of present bias levels. Our model bridges these seminal results
in the optimal taxation literature and brings to bear additional richness due to the interaction
between redistribution and heterogeneity in present bias. In choosing the menu of allocations,
the planner optimally offers a degenerate choice set to low-ability agents, but a tailored menu of
differentially distorted choices to high-ability agents (Theorem 1), with lower savings distortions
toward higher ability levels (Theorem 2).
3 Decentralization using realistic retirement savings policies
The previous section characterized features of the optimal allocation in an environment with
present bias heterogeneity and redistribution. Next, we study the implications of these findings
for the design of realistic policies. To this end, we equip a government with three instruments that
resemble many real-world retirement savings systems.
The first instrument is a tax-financed old-age transfers as a function of life-time income, which
agents cannot borrow against, such as Social Security in the US.13 The second instrument is com-
prised of a finite set of retirement savings accounts with subsidies and contribution limits that
depend on income. We interpret one of these accounts as a regular savings account with no cap.
Mapping this into the real-world policies, we have in mind the multitude of direct contribution
plans such as 401(k) and IRA accounts that feature a combination of tax-incentivized employer
matching, tax-preferred treatment, and contribution limits that depend on income, in addition to
a personal investment account. The third instrument is a non-linear income tax that depends on
the set of retirement savings account used by the agent.
Given their earnings ability θ and one of M present bias levels β, agents take as given the
savings and tax system and decide on how much to work, y, as well as the division of their net
income between consumption and the set of available retirement savings accounts. They receive
mandated old-age benefits b (y), which we think of as their first (forced) savings account. In
13Indeed, the use of Social Security payment streams as collateral on loans is prohibited by federal law under Title
II of the Social Security Act, Sec. 207. [42 USC. 407] (a). See also Feldstein and Liebman (2002) for a discussion of
theoretical and empirical issues related to the Social Security program.
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addition, they may save in retirement savings accounts indexed by m = 2, . . . , M with net rates
of return (1− τm (y)) R and contribution limits am (y).14 Retirement savings accounts are sorted
in the generosity of their subsidy rates, 1 − τ2 (y) ≥ . . . ≥ 1 − τM (y) ≥ 1, so that agents use
account m only after exhausting contribution limits on the more generous accounts 2, . . . , m− 1.
While working, agents face a non-linear income tax TM0 (y), where M0 denotes the least generous
retirement savings account used by the agent.15 The problem that an agent of type (θ, β) solves is
summarized as follows:
max
c1,c2,y,M0
u (c1)− θv (y) + βδu (c2) (4)
s.t. c1 +
M0
∑
m=2
am = y− TM0 (y)
c2 = b (y) + R
M0
∑
m=2
(1− τm (y)) am
0 ≤ am ≤ am (y)
M0 = 1+
M
∑
m=2
1 [am > 0]
Definition 2. A competitive equilibrium with retirement savings policies is a feasible allocation A =
{c1 (θ, β) , c2 (θ, β) , y (θ, β)}(θ,β)∈Θ×B that, given a set of retirement savings and tax-transfer poli-
cies
(
{a¯m (·)}Mm=2 , {τm (·)}Mm=2 , {Tm (·)}Mm=1 , b (·)
)
, solves agents’ problem (4).
In the spirit of Ramsey (1927), the planner takes as given agents’ maximizing behavior and
picks parameters on retirement savings and tax-transfer policies that yields the maximum wel-
fare given social preferences δ and {λ (θ)}θ∈Θ. Such retirement savings policy instruments with
realistic features are sufficient to implement the optimal allocation from the planner’s problem.
Proposition 1. The solution to the planner’s problem can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium
with retirement savings policies. Assume λ′ (θ) ≤ 0 and fix {θ2, . . . , θN−1}. Then there exist scalars
θ > 0 and θ < +∞ such that if θ1 < θ and θN > θ then the decentralization satisfies:
14We could extend our model by allowing for βM > 1, which would require an additional minimum participation
threshold for retirement savings accounts. Indeed, low-income individuals in the US are less likely to have access to
401(k) accounts with employer-matched contributions (Financial Engines, 2015).
15That income taxes depend on savings accounts use is not an unrealistic feature, given that contributions to 401(k) or
IRA accounts, both Roth and regular, have differential tax treatments in the US. The ability to condition income taxes on
savings account usage is a qualitatively important feature of the optimal policy at high incomes, as the planner wants
to levy higher taxes on present-biased high-ability agents relative to more patient agents at the same ability level.
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1. Types θ1 receive only old-age benefits and use none of the optional retirement savings accounts;
2. Types θN use retirement savings accounts in addition to receiving old-age benefits.
Proof. Follows directly from the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2.
The intuition behind the decentralization described above is straight-forward. The two key
features that the optimal policy toolset needs to replicate are: first, bunching of low-income agents
at a uniform, high savings rate; and second, strict separation in savings rates at higher incomes.
The planner must replicate these features by picking policy parameters appropriately. The old-age
benefits schedule must be generous enough relative to low incomes so as to constrain agents to
be at a corner in their savings decision, unwilling to put additional funds in any of the retirement
savings accounts. Old-age benefits must also be small enough relative to high incomes so as to
allow those agents to self-select into the available retirement savings accounts. Agents with high θ
will progressively exhaust the contribution limits on the retirement savings account, starting with
the most generous account and using the account with the next most generous subsidy rate after
that.
We conclude that the optimal policy tools qualitatively resemble many real-world retirement
savings systems, which feature forced savings at low incomes and a choice between multiple
subsidized savings accounts toward higher income levels.
4 Quantitative exercise
This section evaluates through the lens of our normative model current US retirement savings
policies in four steps. First, we develop a broadly applicable computational algorithm that allows
us to numerically solve our framework with general two-dimensional heterogeneity. Second, we
use a positive version of our consumption-savings model to recover the joint distribution of earn-
ings ability and time preferences from microdata on life-time income and wealth accumulation
under current US policies. Third, we adapt the inverse-optimum approach (Bourguignon and
Spadaro, 2012) to select social preferences that most closely rationalize current US savings and tax
policies. Finally, we use the calibrated normative framework to describe optimal savings policies
and quantify welfare gains from reforms to the current system.
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4.1 Numerical algorithm for solving multidimensional screening problems
Finding numerical solutions to two-dimensional screening problems has been recognized to be
a difficult task (Rochet and Choné, 1998). This is partly because many of the techniques that
one-dimensional optimization problems commonly rely on fail in a multi-dimensional context.
Specifically, the first-order approach (Rogerson et al., 1985) does not extend seamlessly to multi-
dimensional settings and thus global IC constraints may bind. This is not just a question of com-
putational intensity. As Judd and Su (2006) point out, when the number of binding IC constraints
at the optimum exceeds the number of choice variables then the linear independence constraint
qualification (LICQ) fails, rendering Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions and other Lagrangian op-
timization routines unstable.16 In a two-period environment with N = Nθ × Nβ types, which
implies N2− N global IC constraints and 3N choice variables, failure of the LICQ may occur with
as few as N = 6 types and in practice occurs commonly for larger N. Consequently, standard
optimization routines such as fsolve or fmincon in MATLAB fail to deliver reliable solutions.
We contribute to this literature a stable and computationally efficient numerical algorithm to
solve a general class of multidimensional nonlinear optimization problems.17 Our algorithm finds
the smallest set of IC constraints sufficient to solve the global program. To this end, we first “con-
vexify” our problem in utility space. We then initiate the algorithm by selecting a small set of
IC constraints in addition to feasibility, which allows us to efficiently solve a relaxed program.
Subsequently, we check global IC before iteratively adding and dropping constraints according to
a stochastic rule based on the ranking of violations for excluded constraints, and Lagrange mul-
tipliers for included constraints at the solution to the relaxed program. Once we find a solution
that satisfies global IC and feasibility, convexity of the problem guarantees that this be the globally
unique solution. In theory, our algorithm converges to the global optimum with probability one,
although convergence take finite but arbitrarily long time. In practice, we find that the algorithm
converges quickly even for large-scale problems.18 Appendix C gives further details of the com-
16Formally, the LICQ states that the gradients of the binding constraints at the solution are linearly independent. The
LICQ is a sufficient condition for convergence in many numerical optimization algorithms and in many applications
necessary for convergence or at least reasonable speed thereof.
17Our algorithm relies neither on the paternalistic nor the redistributive formulation of our problem and can be
readily extended to more general settings.
18In all parameterizations of our problem, we find that a small fraction of all global constraints bind at the solution,
allowing us to solve the problem using optimization routines that are robust to mild LICQ failures. The same solution
may not obtain efficiently when attempting to solve the problem subject to the complete set of global IC constraints.
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putational algorithm and demonstrates its application to a large-scale variant of our problem with
6×1,000 types, 18,000 choice variables, and 35,994,001 constraints.
4.2 Calibrating the joint distribution of earnings ability and time preferences
4.2.1 Calibration strategy
Identification. A key ingredient in our quantitative analysis of optimal savings policies is the
joint distribution of earnings ability and time preferences. To identify this, we use data on retire-
ment savings rates, defined as the ratio of wealth at retirement to life-time earnings, reported in
Engen et al. (2005) using the University of Michigan Health and Retirement Study (HRS). As will
become clear shortly, through the lens of our model, this statistic is informative about an individ-
ual’s propensity to save conditional on an earnings history.
The data show considerable heterogeneity in retirement savings rates both within and between
life-time earnings groups. Figure 2 plots retirement savings rates as a function of savings rate per-
centiles (x-axis) and life-time earnings quartiles (colored lines). Three points are noteworthy. First,
across income groups a substantial share of the population accumulate negligible net financial as-
sets throughout their working life, with over one quarter of individuals entering retirement with
less than five percent of life-time earnings. Second, there is substantial variation in retirement
savings rates within income groups, ranging from close to zero to over 40 percent between the
fifth and 95th percentiles of the savings rate distribution. Third, retirement savings rates show
a mildly positive covariance with life-time earnings quartiles. For example, less than 20 percent
of the highest earnings quartile individuals show at most a five percent retirement savings rate,
while the same fraction is around 50 percent for the lowest earnings quartile.
It should be noted that our identification of time preferences is not free from potential criticism.
For example, Aguiar and Hurst (2005) note that mismeasurement of home production can explain
parts of the observed consumption drop upon retirement. A level shift in retirement wealth is not
per se a problem for our analysis as our focus lies on heterogeneity. Potentially more problematic
is dispersion in the reliance on unmeasured home production, which would tend to lead us to
overestimate the variation in present bias conditional on earnings ability. However, we can allow
for sizable degrees of measurement error in retirement wealth without changing our main conclu-
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Figure 2. Distribution of retirement savings rates by income quartiles
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Note: Each line represents the distribution of retirement savings rates within one life-time earnings quartile. Retirement
savings rates are defined as the ratio of non-Social Security wealth at retirement to life-time earnings. Life-time earnings
are computed given reported earnings history and estimates from Khitatrakun et al. (2000). Non-Social Security wealth
includes all liquid wealth, deposits in retirement accounts, defined benefit plans, business equity, other real estate
equity, and half of the primary home value. Source: Engen et al. (2005) using the 1992 HRS sample of households.
sions. Observed variation in retirement savings rates may also be due to efficient motives outside
of our model, such as heterogeneous longevity risk (Pijoan-Mas and Ríos-Rull, 2014), long-term
care risk (Ameriks et al., 2015), or dynastic precautionary savings (Boar, 2017). We can address this
issue in two ways. First, the richness of the HRS data allows us to partially alleviate such concerns
by controlling for a myriad of covariates including spousal characteristics, health status, inheri-
tance values, retirement age, life expectancy, and degrees of risk aversion. Second, it would be
straight-forward to extend the model to explicitly incorporate other dimensions of heterogeneity
such as differences in life expectancy as a deterministic function of (θ, β).
In support of our interpretation of retirement savings rates as reflecting present bias, the HRS
data show that households with below-median retirement savings rates are 73 percent more likely
to have thought “hardly at all” about retirement and 25 percent less likely to have thought “a lot”
about retirement. Hence the nature of the decision process differs across savings groups, in line
with findings in the psychological science literature linking hyperbolic time discounting to lower
cognitive skills (Burks et al., 2009).
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Parameters. How does our model target the joint distribution of earnings ability and present
bias? To this end, we parameterize household preferences by
U (c1, c2, y; θ, β) =
c1−1/σ1 − 1
1− 1/σ −
`1+1/γ
1+ 1/γ
+ ψ
c1−1/σ2 − 1
1− 1/σ
where labor supply is ` = y/θ. We adopt as exogenous parameters a standard value for the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ = 0.5, and a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of γ = 1,
which falls in the middle of macro- and micro-estimates in the literature (Rogerson, 1988; Chetty,
2012). As alluded to above, the effective discount factor ψ = βδ is identified off heterogeneity in
empirical retirement savings rates conditional on life-time earnings. While β and δ are hard to
identify separately in the data, in the next subsection we infer a value of δ as the discount factor
embedded in current US retirement savings policies. In line with Amador et al. (2006), we view β
in the two-period model as standing in for present bias in the fully dynamic model.
Before calibrating key model parameters, we approximate current US tax-transfer and retire-
ment savings policies in our model. To this end, we model the current US tax-transfer system
using a parsimonious approximation proposed by Feldstein (1969) and used in related work by
Persson (1983), Benabou (2000), Heathcote et al. (2014), and Heathcote and Tsujiyama (2015). In
this formulation, net transfers T depend on taxable income Y according to
T (Y;λ, τ) = Y− λY1−τ (5)
We adopt Heathcote et al. (2014)’s estimates of the level parameter λ and the progressivity param-
eter τ in equation (5) using Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data for 2002–2006. They find
that τ = 0.151 provides the best fit to the current US tax-transfer system, and λ = 0.836 balances
the government budget. Furthermore, we model the current retirement savings system as a com-
bination of old-age benefits and a number of savings vehicle subject to different income-specific
subsidy rates and contribution limits. We model Social Security taxes and transfers using the 2014
income tax rate, a USD 118,500 earnings exemption threshold, and a replacement rate schedule of
old-age transfers as a function of life-time income. We also integrate three different savings ac-
counts: first, a 401(k) account allowing voluntary tax-deferred contributions up to $18,000 plus 50
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percent employer-sponsored contribution matching (Financial Engines, 2015); second, an IRA ac-
count allowing for voluntary tax-deferred contributions up to $5,500; and third, a regular savings
account with a real annual rate of return of R− 1 = 3.44% (Gourinchas and Parker, 2002).
Taking current policies as given, we calibrate the joint distribution of (θ,ψ) to match the joint
distribution of earnings and retirement savings rates in the data. Specifically, we first map per-
centiles of the distribution of average life-time earnings between age 25 to 65 from the 2013
March Current Population Survey (CPS), denoted {y˜i}i, into the model earnings ability distri-
bution. The distribution of life-time earnings in the CPS broadly conforms with that in the HRS
but provides us with more precise estimates of earnings percentiles. We pick the distribution of
earnings ability {θi}i to approximate the earnings distribution by setting θi = y˜1+1/γi . We then
map empirical retirement savings rates from the HRS data into model savings rates {si}i, where
si = (c2,i/R) / (c1,i + c2,i/R). To match retirement savings rates across income groups, we let the
marginal distribution of effective discount factors be ψ ∼ Beta (a, b) with shape parameters a > 0
and b > 0 over ten discrete grid points. The Beta distribution is convenient for our purposes as
it allows for asymmetry and it is bounded in [0, 1]. Importantly, we allow in our calibration for
the possibility that β > 1, implying that agents are more patient than the planner.19 We then de-
fine the joint distribution of earnings ability and present bias as the Gaussian copula between the
marginal distributions of θ and ψ with correlation parameter ω. In practice, our calibration targets
the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the distribution of retirement savings rates across quartiles
of the lifetime earnings distribution, yielding a total of 12 targets.
4.2.2 Calibration results
Table 1 shows the results from our calibration exercise. Ability parameters {θi}i match an earnings
distribution with mean 56,164, while the 10th and 90th percentiles are 13,521 and 112,170, respec-
tively, all reported in 2013 US dollars. The mean effective discount factor is ψannual = 0.985.20
Our calibration also points to considerable heterogeneity in discount factors, but with 90 per-
cent of mass between 0.905 and 0.999 in annualized terms. Finally, the Gaussian copula correla-
19The proposition that government is more myopic than its citizens is a common tenet in the political economy and
international finance literatures (Aguiar and Amador, 2011; Halac and Yared, 2015).
20We annualize the discount factor ψannual assuming 40 periods of working life and 20 periods of retirement such
that ψ = ψ40annual
(
1− ψ21annual
)
/
(
1− ψ41annual
)
. Our estimate corresponds to a mean compound private discount factor
of ψ = 0.322 between work and retirement periods.
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tion parameter between discount factors and earnings ability is estimated to be slightly negative,
ω = −0.107. But importantly this leads to a mildly positive correlation of 0.100 between dis-
count factors and earnings, as individuals with a higher discount factor endogenously supply
more labor. Overall, our present bias estimates fall within a range of empirically plausible esti-
mates, suggesting that this parameter choice provides a reasonable basis for our optimal policy
analysis.21
Table 1. Calibration results for joint distribution of earnings ability and discount factors
Description Values
PANEL A. CALIBRATED PARAMETERS
{θi}i CPS earnings percentiles
a 0.855
b 1.795
ω -0.107
PANEL B. IMPLIED MOMENTS
Earnings y, mean 56,164
Earnings y, 10th percentile 13,521
Earnings y, 90th percentile 112,170
Annualized discount factor ψannual , mean 0.985
Annualized discount factor ψannual , 10th percentile 0.905
Annualized discount factor ψannual , 90th percentile 0.999
Corr (y,ψannual) 0.100
Note: The ability distribution {θi}i is picked to match CPS earnings percentiles, reported in 2013 US dollars. Discount
factors are distributed ψ ∼ Beta (a, b) and reported as an annualized discount factor ψannual , assuming 40 periods of
working life and 20 periods of retirement, where ψ = ψ40annual
(
1− ψ21annual
)
/
(
1− ψ41annual
)
. The joint distribution is a
Gaussian copula between marginal distributions of ability and discount factors with correlation parameter ω.
Table 2 reports the model fit vis-à-vis the data. Because we tie our hands with a sparse param-
eterization, the model cannot perfectly match the empirical discount factor distribution, although
its overall shape is captured well. In our model as in the data, there are large differences in savings
rates within life-time earnings quartiles, which our model generates through dispersion in present
bias conditional on earnings ability. Our calibrated model also matches the positive gradient of
savings rates across life-time earnings quartiles, captured by the correlation parameter ω. The
21While reduced form in nature, our estimates broadly conform with findings from a range of different settings. See
Augenblick et al. (2015) and Beshears et al. (2015) for laboratory experiments; Ashraf et al. (2006), Tanaka et al. (2010),
Jones and Mahajan (2015), and Kaur et al. (2015) for field experiments; and Laibson et al. (1998, 2017) for natural field
data estimates of present bias. The positive gradient of estimated discount factors in income we find is in line with
empirical correlations between life-time income and savings rates (Dynan et al., 2004) as well as with present bias
estimates in Paserman (2008), Meier and Sprenger (2015), and Lockwood (2016). See also De Nardi and Fella (2017) for
a comprehensive overview of dynamic quantitative models linking wealth heterogeneity to preference heterogeneity.
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large amount of dispersion in empirical retirement savings rates leads us to estimate significant
heterogeneity in present bias, both within and across income groups.
Table 2. Calibration fit to retirement savings rates by life-time earnings quartile
Q1 (lowest) Q2 Q3 Q4 (highest)
Savings rate percentile Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
25 0.0165 0.0163 0.0398 0.0367 0.0590 0.0451 0.0593 0.0653
50 0.0554 0.0899 0.0860 0.1021 0.1024 0.1083 0.1248 0.1254
75 0.1322 0.1431 0.1664 0.1712 0.1726 0.1765 0.2211 0.1839
Note: Objective in calibration is to minimize L2 norm between model and data statistics. Retirement savings rates are
defined as the ratio of non-Social Security wealth at retirement to life-time earnings. Life-time earnings are computed
given reported earnings history and estimates from Khitatrakun et al. (2000). Non-Social Security wealth includes all
liquid wealth, deposits in retirement accounts, defined benefit plans, business equity, other real estate equity, and half
of the primary home value. Source: Engen et al. (2005) using the 1992 HRS sample of households.
4.3 Inferring social preferences using the inverse-optimum approach
In this subsection, we compare current US retirement savings and tax policies with optimal poli-
cies arising from our normative model. In theory, we could feed any social preferences, consisting
of a set of Pareto weights {λ (θi)}i and discount factor δ, into our model for this policy analysis.
In practice, a growing strand of the public finance literature uses the inverse optimum approach
(Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2012; Heathcote and Tsujiyama, 2015; Lockwood and Weinzierl, 2016),
which selects social preferences that most closely rationalize current real-world policies, as a nat-
ural starting point.22 In line with this approach, we measure the distance of current policies from
the Pareto frontier implied by our normative model, thus minimizing the welfare gains available
from reforms to the current system. In a separate exercise, we repeat our analysis through the lens
of a utilitarian planner, thus providing another popular benchmark in the literature.
Following Heathcote and Tsujiyama (2015), we parameterize Pareto weights across ability lev-
els as λ (θ) = exp (−αθ) /
(
∑θ′,β′ pi (θ′, β′) exp (−αθ′)
)
, where α ∈ R indexes the government’s
redistributive motive. If α = 0 then the government is utilitarian, while higher α imply a greater
taste for redistribution. We estimate social preferences (α, δ) by solving our normative model over
a grid of such duplets and then picking the combination that minimizes the L2 norm between
22See Stantcheva (2016) for a discussion of some of the strengths and drawbacks of this approach.
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allocations in the normative and positive versions of our model:23
(α, δ) = arg min
(α˜,δ˜)
∑
θ,β
pi (θ, β)
[(
cn1
(
θ, β; α˜, δ˜
)− cp1 (θ, β))2 + (cn2 (θ, β; α˜, δ˜)− cp2 (θ, β))2 + (yn (θ, β; α˜, δ˜)− yp (θ, β))2]
where superscript n denotes our normative model’s optimal allocation as a function of
(
α˜, δ˜
)
, and
superscript p denotes allocations from our calibrated positive model given current US policies.
Table 3 summarizes our estimation results. We find that α = −0.601 and δannual = 0.974, with
associated compound discount factor δ = 0.224 between working life and retirement, lead the
optimal allocation from our normative model to best approximate the allocation given current
policies in our calibrated positive model. Together with our calibration for ψ this implies that
the level of present bias, βannual = ψannual/δannual , has mean E [βannual ] = 1.011, corresponding
to a compound mean present bias level of E [β] = 1.436 between two periods. Consistent with
recent experimental evidence by Montiel Olea and Strzalecki (2014), we allow for some agents to
be overly patient at the time of their savings decision and our estimates imply that these agents
make up 57 percent of the population. At the same time, 43 percent of the population discount the
future at a higher rate than the planner, indicating that these agents would save less than they do
under current policies.
Table 3. Social preferences estimated using inverse optimum approach
Description Values
PANEL A. ESTIMATED PARAMETERS
Pareto weight curvature α -0.601
Social discount factor δ 0.224
PANEL B. IMPLIED MOMENTS
Pareto weight λ (θ), mean of θ 1.000
Pareto weight λ (θ), 10th percentile of θ 0.836
Pareto weight λ (θ), 90th percentile of θ 1.762
Present bias β, mean 1.436
Present bias β, 10th percentile 0.073
Present bias β, 90th percentile 2.219
Note: The redistributive parameter α guides the gradient of Pareto weights across ability levels according to λ (θ) =
exp (−αθ) /
(
∑θ′ ,β′ pi (θ′, β′) exp (−αθ′)
)
, normalized such that λ (Eθ) = 1.000. The discount factor used to calculate
social welfare V (·) is given by δ.
23As a robustness check we also searched for social preferences that minimize the consumption-equivalent welfare
gain associated with moving from current to optimal policies, yielding qualitatively similar results.
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4.4 Optimal policies and reforms to the current system
In this section, we use the calibrated normative model to compare optimal savings policies versus
the current US retirement savings system.
Redistributive motive and optimal dispersion in savings rates. How much choice in savings
is optimally offered throughout the income distribution? Figure 3(a) plots as a function of in-
come (x-axis) and present bias levels (colored lines) the optimal retirement savings rate, s =
(c2/R) / (c1 + c2/R), from our calibrated normative model. As in Theorem 1 of our theoreti-
cal characterization, low earnings feature a uniform savings rate, while at high earnings optimal
savings rates vary widely across present bias levels. As in Theorem 2, at incomes close to zero
individuals optimally save at a 20 percent rate, which significantly exceeds percent the first-best
savings rate of 16.6 percent. In contrast, savings rates for individuals earning USD 200,000 vary
substantially across types, between 15 and 21 percent. Compared to the empirical savings rates in
Figure 2, which span a wide array of savings rates in each income quartile, the optimal savings
rates are uniformly higher and less dispersed, particularly at low incomes.
How is this pattern influenced by the planner’s redistributive preferences? Figure 3(b) plots
optimal retirement savings rates for a planner with utilitarian (i.e. more redistributive) preferences
than in the benchmark while keeping all other parameters fixed. At low earnings, the level and
dispersion of optimal retirement savings rates is similar to our benchmark calibration. At high
earnings, however, greater taste for redistribution implies considerably more dispersion in opti-
mal savings rates. For example, the range of optimal savings rate at high incomes increases sub-
stantially, varying between 10 and 25 percent. The planner uses flexibility in savings rates at high
earnings to extract more resources for redistribution toward the bottom. Conversely, the more the
planner cares about low-ability individuals, the lower the welfare losses from high-ability types
deviating from the preferred savings rate. As a result, the optimal dispersion of savings rates at
higher incomes is increasing in the planner’s redistributive taste α. For higher α, the optimal sav-
ings rates more closely approximate empirical savings rates at high incomes, although low-income
individuals still save too little relative to the social optimum.
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Figure 3. Optimal retirement savings rates fan out under more redistributive welfare function
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(b) Utilitarian planner
0 50000 100000 150000 200000
Avg. Annual Labor Earnings
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
R
e
ti
re
m
e
n
t 
C
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
β= 0.17
β= 0.63
β= 1.21
β= 1.96
β= 3.06
First Best
Note: Proportion of retirement consumption is defined as s = (c2/R) / (c1 + c2/R). The horizontal axis shows annu-
alized earnings during working life, while the vertical axis shows the optimal proportion of retirement consumption.
Each line represent the allocation of agents with a given level of β. Benchmark is the main calibration described in the
text, using less redistributive than utilitarian welfare weights. Utilitarian is attaching equal weights across ability types
and using the same calibrated discount factor δ as in the benchmark calibration.
Quantitative analysis of optimal savings accounts. What are the quantitative features of opti-
mal savings accounts, and how do they compare to the current US retirement savings system?
Figure 4 plots the caps on retirement savings accounts arising from the benchmark normative
model. Individuals with annual incomes up to USD 65,000 receive only Social Security payments.
Above that threshold, optimal savings vehicles include a “subsidized account” with a contribu-
tion limit of around 1.8 percent of income, and a “tax-preferred account” with a limit of around 3.7
percent. Further accounts have caps close to zero. Hence, a small number of accounts is sufficient
to approximate the optimal savings schedule.
Figure 5 plots optimal tax (if positive, or subsidy if negative) rates on savings across retirement
savings accounts in the decentralization. Optimal subsidy rates are progressive (i.e. lower subsi-
dies, or higher taxes, at higher incomes). The “subsidized account” features a 30 percent subsidy
that phases out to zero around USD 15,000 in annual income before steadily increasing to a 25 per-
cent tax rate at USD 200,000 in earnings. The second “tax-preferred account” is taxed at a rate that
increases from 20 to 40 percent over the same income range. Finally, the tax on a regular savings
account is optimally set around 45 percent. The presence of taxes on savings indicates that the
planner in our benchmark normative model thinks that some individuals want to save too much.
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Figure 4. Optimal contribution limits on retirement savings accounts
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Note: Contribution limits are defined as upper bounds on savings accounts in the decentralization. The horizontal
axis shows annualized earnings during working life, while the vertical axis shows contribution limits for each of three
different retirement savings accounts. Each line represents one of three retirement savings accounts.
Figure 5. Optimal savings taxes on retirement savings accounts
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Note: Savings tax (if positive) or subsidy (if negative) rates on retirement savings accounts. The horizontal axis shows
annualized earnings during working life, while the vertical axis shows the savings tax rate. Each line represents one of
the three retirement savings accounts and the regular savings account.
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We now turn to the analysis of Social Security old-age benefits. Figure 6 compares current US
Social Security old-age benefits (orange dashed line) as a function of annualized earnings (x-axis)
with the normative model implications under the benchmark social preferences (α = −0.601, solid
blue line) and under utilitarian social preferences (α = 0, dashed blue line). In our benchmark cal-
ibration, the planner cares relatively more about high-ability individuals and consequently would
like them to save at much higher levels than currently embedded in the current Social Security
benefits schedule. This is because under this parameterization there is little desire for transfers to-
ward lower income levels and since lower incomes themselves generate relatively few resources
that could be transferred upward, the planner’s objective is primarily to get high-income indi-
viduals to save adequately for retirement. Utilitarian social preferences approximate the shape
of old-age benefits reasonably well, but call for uniformly higher old-age benefits, that is a lower
planner’s discount factor.24
Figure 6. Fit of normative model versus positive model: old-age benefits as a function of income
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Note: Annualized Social Security old-age benefits (y-axis) by annualized labor earnings level (x-axis). Each line rep-
resents the retirement benefits in a different system: current US Social Security old-age benefits (orange dashed line),
normative model with benchmark social preferences (α = −0.601 , solid blue line), and normative model with utilitar-
ian social preferences (α = 0, dashed blue line). US Social Security old-age benefits are approximated using the Social
Security Administration’s Quick Calculator, taking into account contribution limits and decreasing replacement rates
at higher earnings levels.
24Our estimated social discount factor of δ = 0.224 was picked to approximate the consumption-savings allocation
given real-world policies, not to match specific aspects of the current system.
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Welfare gains from reforms. Our framework lends itself to analyzing jointly the current US re-
tirement savings and tax-transfer system. We find large welfare gains from reforms to the current
system as we uncover a tension between its two components. This tension arises because there
exist no social preferences (α, δ) that jointly rationalize both systems.
On one hand, the US tax-transfer system is best justified through welfare weights that are less
redistributive than utilitarian, i.e. put more weight on high ability levels. Indeed, Heathcote and
Tsujiyama (2015) find that the US tax-transfer system is best rationalized by a value of θ = −0.566,
which is more redistributive than a laissez-faire planner (θ = −1) but less redistributive than the
utilitarian benchmark (θ = 0). Those authors also show that the optimal system approximates
well the current US tax-transfer system, with small welfare gains available from reforms.
On the other hand, an evaluation of the US retirement savings system through the lens of our
model requires more redistributive than utilitarian welfare weights in order to match the shape of
the Social Security benefits schedule (Figure 6), and the vast amount of choice in savings offered
to high-income individuals (Figures 2 and 3(a)). To illustrate this divergence, we re-estimate social
preferences to match the current US retirement savings system. We find that a more redistributive
than utilitarian planner (α = 0.150) with low social discount factor (δ = 0.067, or δannual = 0.940)
closely approximates the current system of Social Security and retirement savings accounts on its
own.25 Again, the intuition for this result is that the only reason a planner would offer choice in
savings is to facilitate redistribution of resources toward lower incomes.
Hence, independent of social preferences, the current system is off the Pareto frontier. Our
welfare calculations should be taken with a grain of salt, as they measure the divergence between
the planner’s and agents’ preferences over and above the classical measures in welfare analysis
(Lucas, Jr., 1987; Krusell and Smith, 1999; Krusell et al., 2009), making our estimates not directly
comparable to those calculations. With this qualification in mind, we find large divergence be-
tween allocations under the current policy system and optimal allocations from the calibrated
normative model, amounting to 17.5 percent consumption-equivalent welfare gains in our bench-
mark calibration.26 This welfare distance metric is even larger when adopting social preferences
25Relative to Figure 6, these social preferences shift down the Social Security old-age benefits scheduled plotted by
the blue dashed line. Relative to Figure 3(b), these social preferences result in slightly higher dispersion in savings rates
at top incomes, comparable to the empirical savings rates across income groups shown in Figure 2.
26We compute consumption-equivalent welfare gains as a uniform change in consumption during working life and
retirement, holding fixed labor supply.
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to match either one of the retirement savings or tax-transfer systems individually. Hence, there
is a tension in reconciling the current US system through the lens of our model that allows us to
jointly evaluate existing retirement savings and tax-transfer policies.
How much does a planner value simple reforms to the current system? To answer this ques-
tion, we consider the following realistic policy instruments: a tax-transfer schedule with parame-
ters λ and τ as in equation (5); uncapped social security contributions and benefits with a constant
replacement rate γ > 0 at all earnings levels; a single retirement savings account with a minimum
earnings eligibility threshold ymin ≥ 0, a contribution limit as a share of labor income amax (y) = ay
for a ∈ [0, 1], and a government-sponsored matching rate of 50 percent; and a regular savings ac-
count subject to regular income taxes. Given our benchmark social preferences, we then solve the
Ramsey problem of a planner equipped with these simple policy instruments.
We find that with these simple instruments the government is able to obtain sizable consumption-
equivalent welfare gains of 7.0 percent, or 40 percent of the full optimum. In this exercise, the op-
timal policy involves significantly higher social security benefits (γ = 1.94) funded by more pro-
gressive income taxation (λ = 0.74 and τ = 0.41). Individuals with incomes above ymin =34,775
US dollars start using the retirement savings account, which is capped at 0.6 percent of income. In
essence, given our estimated Pareto weights, the government should increase old-age consump-
tion and reduce savings choice throughout the earnings distribution, relative to the current US
retirement system.
5 Generalization to other behavioral and neoclassical problems
Our main insights extend naturally into a variety of behavioral and neoclassical environments
featuring two key ingredients. The first ingredient is heterogeneous disagreement between agents
and the planner. Following Mullainathan et al. (2012), we summarize this as preference wedges
between agents’ and the planner’s evaluations of the returns to some action. In a behavioral con-
text, preference wedges may arise due to harm that agents inflect on themselves when they suffer
from psychological biases leading to deviations from the rational choice paradigm. In a purely
neoclassical context, preference wedges may arise when externalities lead one agent’s actions to
have unpriced effects on others. While both environments share the presence of a paternalistic
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motive, the extent of disagreement between agents and the planner varies due to differences in
the strength of behavioral biases, or due to differences in the extent to which economic context
shapes individuals’ incentives to engage in the production of externalities.
The second ingredient is the desire of the planner to collect revenues. In this context, the
classical motive stressed by the public finance literature is redistribution. But proceeds from tax
collection may also be used to finance public spending that is valued in the government’s utility
function. We will discuss below the case of redistribution, although our insights extend directly
to other motives for revenue generation.
In a general environment combining these two ingredients, there is a trade-off between pater-
nalism and redistribution. Our general result is that optimal policies involve a quantity restric-
tions at low earnings, whereas at high earnings individuals are given a choice between distorted
options.
5.1 General environment
A continuum of consumers are characterized by earnings ability θ ∈ Θ = {θ1, . . . , θN} ⊆ R+ and
their strength of temptation α ∈ A = {α1, . . . , αM} ⊆ R with 0 ∈ A. They take an action a = [0, 1]
with associated unit cost p and income-equivalent benefit b that depends on a such that b′ (a) > 0
and b′′ (a) < 0. We impose b′ (0) > p and b′ (1) < p to guarantee an interior solution.
A planner evaluates welfare according to agents experienced utility, which depends on con-
sumption c and earnings y according to
U E (θ) = u (c)− v (y)
θ
where u′ (·) > 0, u′′ (·) < 0, v′ (·) > 0,v′′ (·) > 0, and limy→0 v′ (y) = 0. Note that experienced
utility depends on the action a only through its effect on consumption. Meanwhile, agents act
according to their decision utility
UD (θ, α) = u (c) + αε (a)− v (y)
θ
which depends on consumption c, earnings y and the payoff to a generic action a. Here, αε (a)
is a preference wedge that consists of two elements: first, the strength of temptation α, which we
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allow to vary across individuals and be either be positive (leading to excessive action taking) or
negative (leading to insufficient action taking); and second, the temptation utility ε (a) such that
ε′ (·) > 0, ε′′ (·) ≤ 0 and b (ε−1 (·)) is weakly concave.
For α = 0 we have U E = UD and there is agreement between the government and the agents.
For α 6= 0, an agent’s private cost (or gain) from action a differs from the social cost (or gain) from
that action. We assume agents types are unobservable and distributed according to pi (θ, α) with
full support. An allocation {a (θ, α) , c (θ, α) , y (θ, α)}(θ,α)∈Θ×A is resource compatible if
∑
θ,α
pi (θ, α) [y (θ, α)− c (θ, α)− pa (θ, α) + b (a (θ, α))] ≥ 0
In this abstract formulation, the first-best level of the action a is given by, a∗ = b′−1 (p) ∈ (0, 1),
which does not vary with agents’ type and is independent of redistribution.27
Consider first the laissez-faire economy without government intervention. Agents then choose
(a, c, y) to maximize UD (θ, α) subject to the budget constraint y− c− pa + b (a) ≥ 0. Then agents
with α 6= 0 will choose a laissez-faire level of action aLF (θ, α) 6= a∗ and aLF (θ, α) 6= aLF (θ, α′)
for α 6= α′. Next, we consider optimal government intervention, starting with the case of no
redistribution. In this case, it is straight-forward to show that the socially optimal policy is a
quantity restriction of a (θ, α) = a∗, allowing agents to choose income y and consumption c to
satisfy y (θ, α)− c (θ, α)− pa∗ + b (a∗) ≥ 0. In this case, since the government’s preferred action
is that of the laissez-faire economy with zero preference wedges, then the first best-level of the
action does not depend on agent’s types.
Finally, we consider the general case with redistribution under utilitarian or more redistribu-
tive welfare weights.
Theorem 3. Assume λ′ (θ) ≤ 0 and fix {θ2, . . . , θN−1}. Then there exist scalars θ > 0 and θ < +∞ such
that at the solution to the planner’s problem:
1. If θ1 < θ, then all types {(θ1, α) : α ∈ A} are bunched, i.e. for all α ∈ B:
(a (θ1, α) , c (θ1, α) , y (θ1, α)) = (a (θ1) , c (θ1) , y (θ1))
27In the context of our two-period savings model in Section 2, the action corresponded to picking a savings rate
s = (c2/R) / (c1 + c2/R).
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2. If θN > θ, then types {(θN , α) : α ∈ A} are separated in their action and consumption, i.e. for some
α, α′ ∈ A:
(a (θN , α) , c (θN , α)) 6=
(
a
(
θN , α′
)
, c
(
θN , α′
))
Proof. See Appendix D.
Theorem 3 extends our previous result on bunching and separation in the optimal savings
problem (Theorem 1) to this general framework with preference wedges. Specifically, our main
result extends to the case when there is temptation to take insufficient action (α < 0), or temp-
tation to take excessive action (α > 0), or both at once.28 As a corollary, a simple Pigouvian tax
cannot achieve the social optimum. Instead, the efficient policy requires differential distortions
throughout the income distribution, with a menu of choices offered at high income levels.
5.2 Applications to behavioral and neoclassical environments
We briefly discuss give applications of this general framework to both behavioral and neoclassical
environments. In all of the following setups, we consider the problem of a planner with both
paternalistic and redistributive preferences.
Example 1: Inattention and sales taxes (Chetty et al., 2009; Goldin and Homonoff, 2013; Goldin,
2015). Agents may purchase a units of a good with benefit b (a) = a1−γ/ (1− γ) for some γ > 0.
The unit cost p + t consists of the gross price p plus sales tax t. But, to varying degrees, agents are
inattentive to the sales tax, acting as if the net price of the good were p + (1− α) t for α ∈ [0, 1].
Then aB (α) > a∗ for all α > 0 and ε (a) = at is the behavioral wedge.
Our theoretical result above implies that such inattention should be directly addressed for low-
income shoppers (e.g. in basic grocery stores) but to a lesser extent for high-income shoppers (e.g.
in luxury goods stores).
Example 2: Overconfidence and financial regulations (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Scheinkman
and Xiong, 2003). Let b (a) = E [aX] − Var [aX] be the mean-variance utility of an individual
investing in a units of a risky asset X with unit price p. The true population parameters guiding
the random return X are E [X] = µ and Var [X] = σ2. But individuals with varying degrees
28Note that the distortions we characterized for the savings framework in Theorem 2 depend on details of the envi-
ronment in the generic preference wedge formulation.
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overconfidence underestimate the riskiness of returns according to VarB [X] = (1− α) σ2 for α ∈
[0, 1]. The preference wedge associated with overconfidence is then ε (a) = −a2σ2.
Suppose the government levies a financial transaction tax and uses the proceeds for public
spending. An application of our result to this setting implies that the government wants to correct
investment decisions of low-ability agents but differentially distort those of high-ability types.
Example 3: Habit formation and corrective policies (Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; Guo and
Krause, 2011; Koehne and Kuhn, 2015). Let b (a) = a1−γ/ (1− γ) with γ > 0 be the true utility
from taking action a today. Behavioral agents experience additional disutility α
(
a− aR)2 /2, with
the heterogeneous habit formation parameter α indexing the strength of the penalty from taking
an action today that differs from the reference point aR ∈ [0, 1). Agents choose a to maximize
κaγ − α (a− aR)2 /2. If the unit price of the action is p > 1, then the socially optimal action is
given by a∗ = p−1/γ, while behavioral agents with α > 0 would pick aB (α, θ) < a∗ in laissez-faire.
The behavioral wedge in this environment is defined as ε (a) = − (a− aR)2 /2.
Given both paternalistic and redistributive motives, low-ability types optimally take a uniform
action a above the first-best level, while high-ability agents deviate toward their habit to varying
degrees. In particular, it is never optimal to completely correct habits of high-ability types.
Example 4: Smoking and drug policies (Gruber and Köszegi, 2004; O’Donoghue and Rabin,
2006). Agents’ action a ∈ [0, 1] represents cigarette consumption, associated with unit price p >
0 and social benefit b (a) = 0 so that from the government’s perspective, the optimal level of
consumption is a∗ = 0. However, some individuals would like to consume cigarettes as they
experience immediate gratification from smoking according to α
√
a. Here, the preference wedges
is simply ε (a) =
√
a and α ≥ 0 guides agents’ strength of their temptation.
The optimal drug policy is more restrictive towards smokers at lower earnings levels. Such a
policy can be implemented by introducing a voucher-based system for drug usage with voucher
cost assignments decreasing with individual earnings and high enough unit costs so that low-
income individuals effectively do not smoke.
Example 5: Fuel efficiency and environmental policies (Sallee, 2011; Allcott et al., 2014; Golosov
et al., 2014). In the context of environmental policies, let agents’ action a ∈ [0, 1] represent the fuel
efficiency of a purchased purchase. Let the socially optimal level of energy efficiency be a∗ ∈ [0, 1].
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Suppose the cost of a vehicle with energy efficiency a ∈ [0, 1] is pa. The social benefit a vehicle
of type a is b (a), which represents monetary benefits from economic activity net of pollution
costs. Agents differ in their willingness to damage the environment, indexed by α ∈ [0, α], where
0 < α < +∞. The private benefit from purchasing a vehicle of type a is (1+ α) b (a). Not all
agents fully internalize the effects of pollution when purchasing a vehicle so that α > 0 for some
agents. The preference wedge in this environment is ε (a) = αb (a).
Without redistribution, a simple quantity restriction of a (θ, α) = a∗ for all individuals is so-
cially optimal. In contrast, with redistribution, optimal dispersion in fuel efficiency varies along
the income spectrum. At low earnings levels, the optimal policy induces agents to purchase the
same energy efficiency level. Such a policy can be implemented with income tax rebates on vehicle
purchases that depend both on the desired level of energy efficiency of the car and on individual
earnings. At higher earnings levels, the government allows agents to enjoy energy inefficient ve-
hicles in exchange for lower tax rebates. Hence, the government is willing to trade-off a higher
level of externalities from high earnings agents in exchange for increased redistribution.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a normative theory of paternalistic policies. Our main insight is that
the optimal policy restricts choice at low incomes but offers various distorted choices at higher
incomes. Intuitively, the planner offers choice as a carrot and stick to incentivize work effort
among high-ability individuals, thereby facilitating redistribution. We apply this insight to the
study of optimal retirement savings systems. The optimal policy can be implemented through
forced savings at low incomes—similar to Social Security—but a choice between savings accounts
with different subsidies and caps at high incomes—like 401(k) and IRA accounts in the US.
Quantitatively, our calibrated model implies significant variation in the mean level as well
as the dispersion of optimal savings rates throughout the income distribution. Relative to the
current US retirement savings and tax-transfer system, we find large welfare gains from increasing
mandatory savings and limiting savings choice, particularly at low incomes. We find this is due to
a tension between redistributive preferences embedded in the current retirement savings system
versus tax-transfer policies in the US. A small number of realistic retirement savings accounts with
progressive subsidies and linear caps in income approximate well the optimal policy.
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The theoretical insights and numerical solution method we develop in this paper open up
the door to studying a wide class of multi-dimensional screening problems used in public finance,
contract theory, and industrial organization. Our work points to two interesting avenues for future
research. First, it would be interesting to explore to what extent other instances of fiscal, monetary,
and social policies can be rationalized with a paternalistic motive. Second, while our current paper
explores the implications of a given degree of paternalism for optimal policy design, future work
could employ our framework to back out the implied degree of paternalism embedded in different
policies within and across countries.
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Appendix
Outline. The Appendix is organized as follows. Appendix A presents proofs for the two-period
model including our main theoretical results. Appendix B extends our main results to a multi-
period life-cycle model. Appendix C describes details of the numerical solution algorithm. Finally,
Appendix D contains the proof characterizing the generalized problem.
A Proofs for two-period model
A.1 Relevant IC constraints in a simple model with 2× 2 types
In this section, we analyze which IC constraints bind in the simple model with 2× 2 types pre-
sented in Section 2.2. We first show that the IC constraint of type (θH, βL) with respect to low-
ability types is binding. Assume by way of contradiction that the IC constraint of type (θH, βL)
with respect to low-ability agents’ allocation does not bind. Then there is no reason to distort
savings among low-ability types, and thus c1 (θL) = c2 (θL) at the solution. We have already
shown that c2 (θH, βH) ≥ c1 (θH, βH), therefore c2 (θH, βH) ≥ c2 (θL) to preserve IC between the
patient high-ability type and low-ability types. Together with the fact that the IC constraint of
type (θH, βH) with respect to low-ability types must bind in the second-best, this implies that
u (c1 (θL)) + βLδu (c2 (θL)) ≥ u (c1 (θH, βH))− v (y1 (θH, βH))
θH
+ βLδu (c2 (θH, βH))
Consequently, all IC constraints for type (θH, βL) are strictly slack—a contradiction. We conclude
that the IC constraint of type (θH, βL) must be binding with respect to θL-type agents.
Next, we show that the IC constraint of type (θH, βL) is slack with respect to type (θH, βH).
Assume by way of contradiction that it binds. Since the IC constraint of type (θH, βL) with respect
to the θL-types’ allocation is binding, we would have
u (c1 (θH, βH))− v (y1 (θH, βH))
θH
+ βLδu (c2 (θH, βH)) = u (c1 (θL)) + βLδu (c2 (θL))
The solution has c2 (θH, βH) > c2 (θL) or else c2 (θL) ≥ c2 (θH, βH) > c2 (θH, βL), which cannot be
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optimal with no IC constraints binding from low to high ability levels. Then we would have
u (c1 (θH, βH))− v (y1 (θH, βH))
θH
+ δu (c2 (θH, βH)) > u (c1 (θL)) + δu (c2 (θL))
But we know c2 (θH, βH) > c2 (θH, βL) from strict separation of high-ability types, and therefore
all IC constraints of type (θH, βH) agents are strictly slack. This can not be optimal, as a transfer
from type (θH, βH) to low ability would improve welfare—a contradiction. We conclude that the
IC constraint of type (θH, βL) is slack with respect to type (θH, βH).
Finally, the pattern of binding IC constraints for type (θH, βH) depends on fundamentals. For
βL ≈ 1, by continuity of the allocation in its primitives we have c2 (θH, βL) > c2 (θL), which
combined with the fact that the IC constraint of type (θH, βL) binds with respect to θL-types yields
u (c1 (θH, βL))− v (y1 (θH, βL))
θH
+ δu (c2 (θH, βL)) > u (c1 (θL)) + δu (c2 (θL))
In this case, the IC constraint of type (θH, βH) with respect to low-ability types is slack. On the
other hand, if βL ≈ 0 then for low enough λ (θH) we get c2 (θH, βL) ≈ 0 < c2 (θL), and the IC
constraint of type (θH, βH) with respect to low-ability types binds. Hence, the bindingness of
(θH, βH)-types’ IC constraints is a function of model parameters.
It is worth noting that the indeterminacy of which IC constraints bind is precisely what renders
solutions to multi-dimensional screening problems elusive Armstrong (1996); Rochet and Choné
(1998). Therefore, a complete theoretical characterizations of the solution to the class of problems
that we study is infeasible. Conveniently, our characterization of savings rates throughout the
income distribution does not depend on this particular feature of the solution.
A.2 Proofs of general two-period results
A.2.1 Problem reformulation
It is useful to restate the planner’s problem in terms of utility levels by defining ut (θ, β) =
u (ct (θ, β)) for t = 1, 2, and v (θ, β) = v (y (θ, β)). Let ct (θ, β) = C (ut (θ, β)) where C = u−1,
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and y (θ, β) = Y (v (θ, β)) where Y = v−1. Then the planner’s problem can be stated as
min
u1,u2,v
−∑
θ,β
pi (θ, β) λ (θ)
[
u1 (θ, β)− v (θ, β)θ + δu2 (θ, β)
]
(6)
s.t.
[
u1
(
θ′, β′
)− v (θ′, β′)
θ
+ βδu2
(
θ′, β′
)]− [u1 (θ, β)− v (θ, β)θ + βδu2 (θ, β)
]
≤ 0 ∀ (θ, β) , (θ′, β′)
−∑
θ,β
pi (θ, β)
[
Y (v (θ, β))− C (u1 (θ, β))− C (u2 (θ, β))R
]
≤ 0
Clearly, the objective and IC constraints are linear. Since u (·) is increasing and strictly concave and
v (·) is increasing and strictly convex, then C (·) is strictly convex and Y (·) is strictly concave, so
the feasibility constraint is strictly convex. Hence, the planner’s problem (6) is a convex problem.
This will be useful for the following proofs and also for our numerical solution algorithm.
A.2.2 Precursory results
We begin by proving three Lemmas that will be useful in the proofs of the main results. Define
the utility of individuals as U (θ, β) = u1 (θ, β) − v (θ, β) /θ + βδu2 (θ, β) and the utility of the
government as V (θ, β) = u1 (θ, β) − v (θ, β) /θ + δu2 (θ, β). The first Lemma shows that if the
lowest labor earnings ability is sufficiently low, then agents with lowest earnings ability will have
all their IC constraints with respect to higher ability types strictly slack.
Lemma 1. Assume λ′ (θ) ≤ 0. Given {θ2, . . . , θN}, there is θ > 0 such that if θ1 < θ, then at the solution
to the planner’s problem we have
u1 (θ1, β)− v (θ1, β)
θ1
+ βδu2 (θ1, β) > u1
(
θ′, β′
)− v (θ′, β′)
θ1
+ βδu2
(
θ′, β′
)
for θ′ ∈ {θ2, . . . , θN}.
Proof. Consider the case of θ1 = 0. Then for any v1 (θ1, β) > 0 we would have V (θ1, β) = −∞.
Sincepi (·) has full support and λ (·) is weakly decreasing, hence nonzero at θ1, thenpi (θ1, β) λ (θ1) >
0 and this cannot be optimal. Therefore v (θ1, β) = 0, so θ1-types optimally do not work at the so-
lution to the planner’s problem. Next, we show that all types θ′ > 0 work positive amounts.
Assume by way of contradiction that v(θ′, β′) = 0 for some θ′ > 0 and β′ ∈ {β1, . . . , βM}. Since
Y′ (0) = +∞ then this agent could work an infinitesimal amount and produce enough resources
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to make all agents strictly better off—a contradiction.29 Therefore v (θ′, β′) > 0 and hence a de-
viation by θ1-types into (θ′, β′)-types’ allocation is not possible since u1 (θ′, β′) − v (θ′, β′) /θ1 +
βδu2 (θ′, β′) = −∞. Hence, Lemma 1 holds for θ1 = 0.
By the Theorem of the Maximum, as we increase θ1 the solution to the planner’s problem is
continuous in θ1 and the above properties are preserved. Hence, there exists θ > 0 such that for
all θ1 < θ and for all (θ′, β′) with θ′ > θ1 and β′ ∈ B the solution to the planner’s problem satisfies
the desired property.
Lemma 1 will be useful because for low enough ability types we need not worry about IC
constraints binding upward in the ability dimension. The second Lemma uses a similar argument
to show that if the highest ability type is sufficiently high, then IC constraints of all other agents
with respect to that type are strictly slack.
Lemma 2. Assume λ′ (θ) ≤ 0. Given {θ1, . . . , θN−1}, there exists θ < +∞ such that if θN > θ then at
the solution to the planner’s problem we have
u1
(
θ′, β′
)− v (θ′, β′)
θ′
+ β′δu2
(
θ′, β′
)
> u1 (θN , β)− v (θN , β)
θ′
+ β′δu2 (θN , β)
and
v (θN , β) > v
(
θ′, β′
)
for all θ′ ∈ {θ1, . . . , θN−1} and for all β, β′ ∈ {β1, . . . , βM}.
Proof. We use an analogous argument to that presented in the proof of Lemma 1. As θ → +∞,
then v (θN , β)− v (θ′, β′) → +∞, since the relative social value from making θN-types work more
tends to infinity, and hence upward-binding IC constraints are strictly slack for all θ′ < θN . By
a limiting argument and using continuity of the solution to the planner’s problem, there exists
θ < +∞ that satisfies the desired properties.
Lemma 2 will be useful because we can ignore IC constraints of lower ability types with respect
to the highest ability types. The third Lemma shows that the most present-biased high-ability
types are compensated for their higher work effort with higher consumption in either period.
29Formally, consider a perturbation to all agents such that v˜ (θ, β) = v (θ, β) + ε and u1 (θ, β) = u1 (θ, β) + ν for
ε, ν > 0. Since the original allocation satisfies IC and the perturbation is uniform, the perturbation also satisfies IC. The
implied resource cost is dE = ∑θ,β pi (θ, β) [C′ (u1 (θ, β)) ν−Y′ (v (θ, β)) ε]. Since C′ (u1 (θ, β)) < ∞, then for any ε > 0
we have dE = −∞ as Y′ (0) = +∞. Welfare changes by dW = ∑θ,β pi (θ, β) λ (θ) (ν− ε) = ν− ε. For ν > ε and small
enough ν and ε, this perturbation is also feasible and increases welfare, a contradiction.
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Lemma 3. Assume λ′ (θ) ≤ 0. Given {θ1, . . . , θN−1}, there exists θ < +∞ such that if θN > θ then at
the solution to the planner’s problem we have either u1 (θN , β) > u1 (θ′, β′) or u2 (θN , β) > u2 (θ′, β′) for
all θ′ ∈ {θ1, . . . , θN−1} and β, β′ ∈ B.
Proof. By IC for θN-types we have
u1 (θN , β)− 1
θN
[
v (θN , β)− v
(
θ′, β′
)]
+ βδu2 (θN , β) ≥ u1
(
θ′, β′
)
+ βδu2
(
θ′, β′
)
From Lemma 2, there exists θ < +∞ such that v (θN , β) > v (θ′, β′) and hence
u1 (θN , β) + βδu2 (θN , β) > u1
(
θ′, β′
)
+ βδu2
(
θ′, β′
)
Therefore, the desired property holds.
A.2.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Part 1.
Proof. From Lemma 1 we know that there exists θ > 0 such that
u1 (θ1, β)− v (θ1, β)
θ1
+ βδu2 (θ1, β) > u1
(
θ′, β′
)− v (θ′, β′)
θ1
+ βδu2
(
θ′, β′
)
for all β, β′ ∈ {β1, . . . , βM} and θ′ ∈ {θ2, . . . , θN}. Assume by way of contradiction that types
(θ1, β) 6= (θ1, β′) receive different allocations. If (u1 (θ1, β) , u2 (θ1, β)) = (u1 (θ1) , u2 (θ1)) for all
β ∈ B then we must have y (θ1, β) = y (θ1) by IC among θ1-types. Hence the relevant case features
(u1 (θ1, β) , u2 (θ1, β)) 6= (u1 (θ1, β′) , u2 (θ1, β′)) for some β, β′ ∈ B. Then consider a perturbation
u˜t (θ1, β) = u˜t (θ1) =∑
β
(
pi (θ1, β)
∑β′ pi (θ1, β′)
)
ut (θ1, β)
v˜ (θ1, β) = v˜ (θ1) =∑
β
(
pi (θ1, β)
∑β′ pi (θ1, β′)
)
v (θ1, β)
and keep all other allocations the same. Since all IC constraints are linear in ut and v, a convex
combination of their arguments preserves IC. Since the allocation for (θ1, β) was initially differ-
ent from that for (θ1, β′), and since C (·) is strictly convex and Y (·) is strictly concave, the new
allocation saves a strictly positive amount of resources while maintaining a constant welfare level.
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But then the planner could improve welfare by distributing the extra resources uniformly across
agents—a contradiction. Hence, agents of type (θ1, β) for all β ∈ {β1, . . . , βM} are bunched.
Part 2.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that all agents with types (θN , β) for β ∈ B receive the
same allocation, (u1 (θN) , u2 (θN) , v (θN)). This implies that for some constant κ > 0:
RδC′ (u1 (θN))
C′ (u2 (θN))
= κ
For κ < 1 (over-saving), consider the following perturbation, which keeps welfare constant:
u˜1 (θN) = u1 (θN) + δε
u˜2 (θN) = u2 (θN)− ε
Agents with a present bias level β will perceive this perturbation as a decision utility change of
dU (θN , β) = (1− β) δε
Whenever ε > 0 this perturbation is incentive compatible. Its marginal resource cost is
dE =
∑β pi (θN , β)C′ (u2 (θN))
R
(κ − 1) ε
If we had κ < 1 then this perturbation would generate extra resources for the government—a
contradiction. Then it must be the case that κ ≥ 1.
For κ > 1 (under-saving), consider a perturbation to the allocation offered to (θN , βM)-types:
u˜1 (θN , βM) = u1 (θN)− δε
u˜2 (θN , βM) = u2 (θN) + ε
This perturbation keeps welfare constant and preserves IC since agents with type β < 1 dislike
the new allocation as long as ε > 0. The marginal resource cost is
dE =
pi (θN , βM)C′ (u2 (θN))
R
(1− κ) ε
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Hence for ε > 0 we have dE < 0 since κ > 1, meaning that the planner generates extra resources
while preserving IC and keeping welfare constant—a contradiction. We conclude that κ = 1.
Now consider the case when κ = 1 (saving at efficient rate). From Lemma 3 we have that either
u1 (θN) > u1 (θ, β) or u2 (θN) > u2 (θ, β) for all θ ∈ {θ1, . . . , θN−1} and all β ∈ B. We prove the
Theorem for the first case, as the second case is analogous. Consider the following perturbation:
u˜1 (θN , β1) = u1 (θN) + β1δε+ ν
u˜2 (θN , β1) = u2 (θN)− ε
where ε > 0 and ν > 0. While keeping all else unchanged, for (θ, β) 6= (θN , β1) we set
u˜1 (θ, β) = u˜1 (θ, β) + ν
It is easy to check this preserves IC. The marginal resource cost of this perturbation is
dE = pi (θN , β1) (β1 − 1) C
′ (u2 (θN))
R
ε+∑
θ,β
pi (θ, β)C′ (u1 (θ, β)) ν
By setting dE = 0 we get
ν = pi (θN , β1) (1− β1) δ C
′ (u1 (θN))
∑θ,β pi (θ, β)C′ (u1 (θ, β))
ε
The implied welfare change is then
dW = pi (θN , β1) (1− β1) δ
[
C′ (u1 (θN))
∑θ,β pi (θ, β)C′ (u1 (θ, β))
− λ (θN)
]
ε
Since ∑θ,β pi (θ, β) λ (θ) = 1 and λ′ (·) ≤ 1 we have λ (θN) ≤ 1, which together with the fact that
u1 (θN) > u1 (θ, β) for all θ < θN and β ∈ B by Lemma 3 implies dW > 0. Hence this perturbation
increases welfare, preserves IC, and is cost-neutral—a contradiction.
We conclude that not all agents with types (θN , β) for β ∈ B receive the same allocation.
A.2.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Part 1.
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Proof. We begin by proving the results for θ1-types. By Lemma 1, given {θ2, . . . , θN}, there exists
θ > 0 such that for θ1 < θ the IC constraints of type (θ1, β) are strictly slack with respect to (θ′, β′)-
types’ allocations for θ′ > θ1. By Theorem 1, agents with type (θ1, β) receive the same allocation
for all β ∈ B, so for some constant κ > 0:
RδC′ (u1 (θ1))
C′ (u2 (θ1))
= κ
Then consider the following perturbation to θ1-types’ allocation, which keeps the welfare constant:
u˜1 (θ1) = u1 (θ1)− δε
u˜2 (θ1) = u2 (θ1) + ε
For ε > 0 sufficiently small, this perturbation is incentive compatible because IC constraints of
types θ1 were slack to begin with and all agents find the new allocation provides (weakly) lower
utility than the old allocation. The marginal resource cost of this perturbation is
dE =∑
β
pi (θ1, β)
[
C′ (u2 (θ1))
R
− δC′ (u1 (θ1))
]
ε
=∑
β
pi (θ1, β) (1− κ) C
′ (u2 (θ1))
R
ε
If κ > 1 then for ε > 0 we have dE < 0, so that the perturbation generates extra resources—a
contradiction. Hence κ ≤ 1. Recalling the definition of C (·), we have C′ (·) = 1/u′ (C (·)) and
thus τE (θ1) ≤ 0. It follows that τD (θ1, β) < 0 for β < 1 and τD (θ1, βM) ≤ 0.
Part 2.
Proof. We now turn to the results for θN-types. We first show that (θN , βM)-types face a weakly
negative decision wedge. Assume by way of contradiction that
RδC′ (u1 (θN , βM))
C′ (u2 (θN , βM))
> 1
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Consider the following perturbation to the allocation of (θN , βM), while leaving all else unchanged:
u˜1 (θN , βM) = u1 (θN , βM)− δε
u˜2 (θN , βM) = u2 (θN , βM) + ε
This perturbation is incentive compatible as agents with βM = 1 are left indifferent, while agents
with β < 1 prefer the original allocation. But this perturbation generates extra resources as
dE = pi (θN , βM)
(
1− RδC
′ (u1 (θN , βM))
C′ (u2 (θN , βM))
)
ε
so for ε > 0 we have dE < 0 so the perturbation saves resources—a contradiction. Hence
τD (θN , βM) = τE (θN , βM) ≤ 0.
To show that τE (θN , β1) > 0 we proceed analogously to the proof for Part 2 of Theorem 1.
B Characterization of a multi-period life-cycle model
B.1 Model setup
In this section, we present a multi-period life-cycle model with stochastic earnings ability and self-
control shocks. We characterize the efficient dynamic provision of insurance and commitment
in this environment. Extending our results from the 2-period model, we show that a trade-off
between providing insurance and providing commitment arises for agents who experience high
income shocks, but not for agents with low income shocks. As a result, commitment is optimally
provided only at low income levels.
In the following setup, we assume hyperbolic preferences shocks over the life cycle. While re-
lated work uses off-equilibrium path allocations to separate different degrees of time-inconsistency
(Esteban and Miyagawa, 2004; Galperti, 2015; Yu, 2016), we effectively sidestep these intricacies
by introducing stochastic time inconsistency levels. While studying a model with constant present
bias is of great theoretical interest, our setup simplifies the analysis significantly and has two fur-
ther advantages. First, our setup allows for changes in individuals’ present bias over the life cycle,
such as myopia that decreases with age. Second, our setup is robust to small stochastic perturba-
tions in the hyperbolic discount factor, which the other setup abstracts from in order to generate
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perfectly persistent private information.
The economy is composed of a measure one of agents whose life cycle consists of T ≥ 3
periods, divided into Tw periods of working life and T − Tw periods of retirement.30 At each
t = 1, . . . , Tw, agents face an earnings ability shock θt ∈ Θ = {θ1, . . . , θN}, where θ1 < . . . < θN ,
with transition probabilities ρt+1 (θt+1|θt). We allow transition probabilities to vary over the life-
cycle and and assume full support over Θ at all t and for all θt ∈ Θ. We also assume that ρt+1 is
stochastically ordered so that higher levels of θt imply a distribution that first order stochastically
dominates a distribution for lower levels of θt. With a slight abuse of notation, we denote by
ρ1 (θ1) the probability distribution over the initial earnings ability θ1 and assume that it also has
full support.
Furthermore, At each period t = 1, . . . , T − 1 each agent faces a hyperbolic self-control shock
βt ∈ B = {β1, . . . , βM}, where β1 < . . . < βM, which we assume to be independently distributed
both over time and from earnings ability shocks. We allow the probability distribution of self-
control shocks at period t, denoted γt (βt), to vary over the life-cycle as long as there is full support.
We denote an agent’s joint type by ht = (βt, θt) ∈ Ht and its distribution at time t by pit. We
mark by superscript t the history of types realized until period t, so that ht = (h1, . . . , ht) ∈ Ht.
We let pit denote the probability distribution over Ht.
The period payoff during working life periods t = 1, . . . , Tw over consumption and obtained
earnings is given by uW (ct, yt; ht) = u (ct)− v (yt) /θt, where we assume u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, v′ > 0,
v′ (0) = 0, v′′ > 0, and v (0) = 0. During retirement periods t = Tw + 1, . . . , T, the agent is
retired and consumes without working (yt = 0), with period payoff given by uR (ct) = u (ct). The
generalized period payoff function is then
ut (ct, yt; ht) =

uW (ct, yt; ht) for t ≤ Tw
uR (ct) for t > Tw
A planner cannot directly observe agents’ types but designs an incentive compatible and feasi-
ble mechanism that maximizes social welfare. As previously, we apply the Revelation Principle to
characterize implementable allocations in this environment.31 In this environment, an allocation
30We implicitly assume that retirement lasts for at least one period.
31We show in Appendix B.3 that it suffices to consider mechanisms in which at each period agent report their current
type instead of their whole history of types. This result follows from our assumption that hyperbolic preference shocks
are independent over time, and differs from the approach taken in Galperti (2015) and Yu (2016).
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can be written as a sequence of functions (ct, yt) : Ht → R2+ for each t. We define an allocation
as A = (c, y), where c and y denote the entire set of history-dependent consumption and labor
allocations. The planner evaluates welfare according to the period 0 preferences, or experienced
utility, of agents in the economy:
Wt (c, y) =
T
∑
s=1
δs−1∑
hs
pis (hs) us (cs (hs) , ys (hs) ; hs) (7)
Following a large strand in the behavioral public finance literature, we interpret this as the prob-
lem of an agent at period 0 seeking the optimal level of insurance for earnings ability shocks and
a commitment device for self-control shocks over the life-cycle. Therefore, the efficient allocation
could be implemented either by the government or by competitive private insurance companies,
as long as both are able to enforce the contract.
Agents, once they reach the decision stage, have a present-biased evaluation of life-time utility,
leading them to evaluate decision utility at time t as
Ut (c, y; hτ) =ut
(
ct
(
ht
)
, yt
(
ht
)
; θt
)
+ βτ
T
∑
s=t+1
δs−t∑
hs
pis (hs) us (cs (hs) , ys (hs) ; θs)
where we assume agents to be sophisticated in that they expect their future selves to be subject
to some degree of present bias. Hence, there is dynamic disagreement between different period
selves of the same (β, θ)-type as in Laibson (1997). A contract satisfies IC at time t if
ht = arg max
h′t
Ut
(
c, y; h′t
)
(8)
We assume that there is a fixed gross rate of return R per period. A contract is feasible at time t if
T
∑
s=t
1
Rs−1 ∑hs
pi (hs) [ys (hs)− cs (hs)] ≥ 0 (9)
An allocation is implementable if it satisfies both IC (8) and feasibility (9) in all periods t.
Definition 3. The planner’s problem is to choose a second-best or constrained efficient allocationA∗∗
that maximizes welfare (7) subject to being implementable. We say an allocation A∗ is first-best or
efficient if it maximizes welfare (7) subject to feasibility (9) at all t.
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B.2 General results
We now characterize properties of the planner’s problem solution, which provides the efficient
balance of insurance against earnings ability shocks and self-control shocks. By insurance of self-
control shocks we mean that in any period t agents with lack of self-control (βt < 1) and agents
with self control (βt = 1) are assigned the same allocation conditional on the whole history of
earnings ability shocks they reported. Therefore, it is natural to interpret insurance of self-control
shocks as provision of commitment by the planner.
Bunching and separation. Our first main result extends Theorem 1 to this dynamic economy,
showing that full commitment is provided only to parts of the population.
Theorem 4. Fix {θ2, . . . , θN−1} and {β2, . . . , βM}. Then there exist scalars θ > 0, θ < +∞, and β > 0
such that at the solution to the planner’s problem:
1. If θ1 < θ, then for any t = 1, . . . , T− 1 and history ht−1 agents with types
{(
ht−1, (θ1, β)
)
: β ∈ B}
are all assigned the same level of consumption and earnings in period t and are assigned the same
continuation allocation for all future periods:
ct
(
ht−1, (θ1, β)
)
= ct
(
ht−1,
(
θ1, β′
))
yt
(
ht−1, (θ1, β)
)
= yt
(
ht−1,
(
θ1, β′
))
ct+s
(
ht−1, (θ1, β) , (ht+1, . . . , ht+s)
)
= ct+s
(
ht−1,
(
θ1, β′
)
, (ht+1, . . . , ht+s)
)
yt+s
(
ht−1, (θ1, β) , (ht+1, . . . , ht+s)
)
= yt+s
(
ht−1,
(
θ1, β′
)
, (ht+1, . . . , ht+s)
)
for all β, β′ ∈ B and for all s ≥ 1;
2. If θN > θ and β1 ≤ β, then for any t = 1, . . . , T − 1 and history ht−1 not all agents with types{(
ht−1, (θN , β)
)
: β ∈ B} are assigned the same current allocation and continuation allocations.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.3.
The planner values insurance against both earnings ability shocks and self-control shocks. The-
orem (4) shows that it is efficient to provide perfect commitment at low earnings but not at high
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earnings. This result is due to the interaction between the planner’s two motives. Agents value
flexibility after the realization of a self-control shock, demanding more immediate gratification
than their prior selves’ plans. Without an insurance motive, the planner would provide no such
flexibility and instead provide commitment to all agents.32 However, the planner also pursues
the motive of consumption insurance, which in the presence of asymmetric information will be
imperfectly provided. Therefore, the planner can charge high-ability agents for flexibility and use
the proceeds to improve insurance against labor earnings shocks accrued to lower-ability agents.
At low earnings, such a trade is feasible but not optimal since low-ability agents are unable to
compensate the planner for the welfare loss associated with flexibility.
Optimal savings distortions. Our second result characterizes the distortions of time-inconsistent
agents in this dynamic environment. A natural measure of distortions is the wedge relative to a
path of time-consistent intertemporal consumption decisions. Without self-control shocks (β = 1),
efficient insurance implies that intertemporal choices satisfy an inverse Euler equation:33
∑
θt+1∈Θt+1
ρt+1 (θt+1|θt)
u′
(
ct
(
θt
))
δRu′ (ct+1 (θt, θt+1))
= 1
Whenever this intertemporal condition holds, the detrimental effects of time-inconsistency have
been completely dealt with. We can define the time inconsistency wedge in our economy for agents
with history ht as
τ
(
ht
)
= ∑
ht+1∈Ht+1
pit+1
(
ht+1|ht
) u′ (ct (ht))
δRu′ (ct+1 (ht, ht+1))
− 1
If agents face self-control problems when left on their own absent commitment devices, this would
be represented as a negative time consistency wedge. Our second main result extends Theorem 2
to our dynamic economy.
Theorem 5. Fix {θ2, . . . , θN−1} and {β2, . . . , βM}. Then there exist scalars θ > 0, θ < +∞, and β > 0
such that at the solution to the planner’s problem:
1. If θ1 ≤ θ, then for any t = 1, . . . , T − 1 and history ht−1 : τ
(
ht−1, (θ1, β)
) ≥ 0 for all β ∈ B;
32For example, this is the case when θt = θ0 for all agents in the economy at all histories.
33For applications in the context of optimal taxation see Diamond and Mirrlees (1977), Golosov et al. (2003), Golosov
and Tsyvinski (2006), Farhi and Werning (2012), Farhi and Werning (2013), Stantcheva (2015), and Golosov et al. (2016).
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2. If θN > θ and β1 ≤ β, then for any t = 1, . . . , T − 1 and history ht−1:
• τ (ht−1, (θN , βM)) ≥ 0;
• τ (ht−1, (θN , β1)) < 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.4.
Analogous to the intuition behind Theorem 2, savings distortions optimally vary throughout
the income distribution. For low enough productivity types, the planner fully undoes low-ability
types’ self-control problem, and at times may induce savings above the first-best rate (τ
(
ht
)
= 0)
as a screening device. On the other hand, high-ability types are differentially distorted, with the
most patient agents (βM = 1) weakly over-saving, but the lowest ability types strictly under-
saving relative to the efficient level. Thus, not only does the planner provide imperfect commit-
ment at higher ability levels, but it is also optimal to offer greater choice in savings for this part of
the population.
B.3 Proofs of general results in multi-period life-cycle model
B.3.1 Problem reformulation
Types are unobservable and we rely on the Revelation Principle to characterize implementable
allocations. To this end, we define an allocation as a pair of functions (ct, yt) : H1 × · · · × Ht−1 ×
Ht → R2+ for each period t that assigns a consumption level and an earnings level for any reported
history ht ∈ Ht at period t and any past reported history rˆt−1 = (h1, . . . , ht−1) ∈ H1 × · · · × Ht−1.
A strategy for an agent is a sequence of reporting strategies σt : H1 × · · · × Ht−1 × Ht → Ht.
The overall payoff after history ht, previous reports rˆt−1 =
(
r1, . . . , rt−1
) ∈ H1 × · · · × Ht−1 and
following a strategy (σs)
T
s=t from period t on is given by
Ut
(
rˆt−1, ht, (σs)Ts=t
)
=u
(
ct
(
rˆt−1, σt
(
rˆt−1, ht
)))
− v
(
yt
(
rˆt−1, σt
(
rˆt−1, ht
)))
θt
+ βt
T
∑
s=t+1
δs−t ∑
hsht
pis (hs|θt)
[
u
(
cs
(
σs
(
rˆs−1, hs
)))
− v
(
ys
(
σs
(
rˆs−1, hs
)))
θs
]
Note that preferences are hyperbolic with quasi-geometric discount factor βt in period t.34
34We denote by hs  ht the continuation histories at times s > t that are consistent with ht.
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We assume that agents are sophisticated in that they take into account their present bias prob-
lems in the future. Define the truth-telling strategy as σTrutht
(
rˆt−1, ht
)
= ht. An allocation satisfies
IC if truth-telling is a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game played between the selves in dif-
ferent periods, so that after any history of reports rˆt−1 ∈ H1 × · · · × Ht−1 and any realized type
ht−1 truth-telling is the optimal one-shot deviation:
σTrutht ∈ arg max
σ′t
Ut
(
rˆt−1, ht,
(
σ′t ,
(
σTruths
)T
s=t+1
))
Taking into account that future selves will consider it optimal to report the truth, reporting the
truth in period t after history ht is optimal given any reports history rˆt−1. Since this is a Bayesian
game with positive probabilities at all nodes of the game, the Revelation Principle guarantees that
the outcome of any mechanism can be obtained using the allocations defined above.
Our assumptions of full support over types, the Markovian nature of the stochastic process
over types and the planner’s objective allow us to further simplify IC constraints in this environ-
ment. The Markovian structure implies that, conditional on rˆt−1, the preferences after any history
h˜t ∈ Ht with ht = h˜t have the same ordering as the preferences after history ht. As we will
show below, the planner’s objective function is strictly concave, which implies that the optimal
allocation in period t treats agents of type h˜t and ht identically. Hence we can write
ct+s
(
rˆt−1, ht, . . . , hs
)
= ct+s
(
rˆt−1, ht, . . . , hs
)
yt+s
(
rˆt−1, ht, . . . , hs
)
= yt+s
(
rˆt−1, ht, . . . , hs
)
Using this argument recursively for all periods s > t we obtain
ct+s
(
rˆt−1, ht, . . . , hs
)
= ct+s (rˆ1, . . . , rˆt−1, ht, . . . , hs)
yt+s
(
rˆt−1, ht, . . . , hs
)
= yt+s (rˆ1, . . . , rˆt−1, ht, . . . , hs)
where we used that rˆ1, . . . , rˆt are optimal reports for an agent with that history of types. Therefore
it is without loss of generality that the mechanism requires only reporting of the current period
type and not of the full history of types.35
35This characterization implies that only equilibrium path allocations are important for IC (Fernandes and Phelan,
2000; Kapicˇka, 2013). This argument can break down in problems with perfectly correlated types, demonstrated by
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From here onward, we denote by
(
ut
(
ht
)
, vt
(
ht
))
the intra-period allocation in utility space.
B.3.2 Precursory results
The following result is the extension of Lemma 1 to the dynamic economy.
Lemma 4. Given {θ2, . . . , θN}, there is θ > 0 such that if θ1 < θ then at the solution to the planner’s
problem we have
Ut
(
ht−1, (β, θ1)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
truthful report
≥ Ut
((
β′, θ1
) |ht−1, (β, θ1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
deviation in β
> Ut
((
β′, θ′
) |ht−1, (β, θ1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
deviation in θ
and
vt
(
ht−1,
(
β′, θ′
))
> vt
(
ht−1, (β, θ1)
)
for all θ′ > θ1, for all β′ 6= β, for all ht−1, and for all t = 1, . . . , T.
Proof. If θ1 = 0, then yt
(
ht−1, (β, θ1)
)
= 0 for all β ∈ B and all ht−1. For any θ′ > 0, then
yt
(
ht−1, (β′, θ′)
)
> 0, therefore
Ut
((
β′, θ′
) |ht−1, (β, θ1)) = −∞
which proves the second, strict inequality. The first, weak inequality is required by IC. Continuity
of the solution to the planner’s problem then implies that for fixed {θ2, θ3, . . . , θN} there is θ > 0
such that for all θ1 ≤ θ the desired sequence of inequalities holds.
Lemma 5. Given {θ1, . . . , θN−1}, there exists θ < +∞ such that if θN > θ then at the solution to the
planner’s problem we have
Ut
(
ht−1,
(
β′, θ′
))
> Ut
(
(β, θN) |ht−1,
(
β′, θ′
))
and
vt
(
ht−1, (β, θN)
)
> vt
(
ht−1,
(
β′, θ′
))
for all ht−1 , for all θ′ ∈ {θ1, . . . , θN−1}, and for all β, β′ ∈ B.
an example in Battaglini and Lamba (2015). The assumption of full support of βt for all t and histories is crucial for
this characterization to be valid. If there is no full support in βt, then it is possible to design a mechanism in which
off-equilibrium path allocations relax incentive constraints on the equilibrium path, as in Galperti (2015) and Yu (2016).
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Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 2, extended to the dynamic setting.
Lemma 6. Given {θ1, . . . , θN−1} and {β2, . . . , βM}, there exists θ < +∞ and β > 0 such that if θN > θ
and β1 < β then at the solution to the planner’s problem we have ut
(
ht−1, (β1, θN)
)
> ut
(
ht−1, (β, θ)
)
for all ht−1, for all θ ∈ {θ1, . . . , θN−1}, for all β ∈ B and for all t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
Proof. From Lemma 5, we know that vt
(
ht−1, (β1, θN)
)
> vt
(
ht−1, (β, θ)
)
. Note that if β1 = 0,
IC requires ut
(
ht−1, (β1, θN)
)
> ut
(
ht−1, (β, θ)
)
. By continuity of the solution to the planner’s
problem, there exists β
t
> 0 such that this inequality continues to be strict for all β1 < βt. Since
T < ∞ we can pick a uniform level of β = mint
{
β
t
}
> 0 that satisfies the desired property.
B.3.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Part 1.
Proof. Consider the problem in terms of utility levels from consumption and disutility levels from
working as in Appendix A.2.1. Assume by way of contradiction that for a fixed t < T and fixed
history ht−1 ∈ Ht−1 and for β, β′ ∈ Bt the solution to the planner’s problem features
ut
(
ht−1, (β, θ1)
)
> ut
(
ht−1,
(
β′, θ1
))
Consider a new allocation that is a convex combination between between
(
ht−1, (β∗, θ1)
)
-types’
allocations for all β∗ ∈ B and that is offered after history ht−1:
u˜t
(
ht−1, (β∗, θ1) , ht+1, . . . , hT
)
= ∑
b∈B
pit
(
(b, θ1) |ht−1
)
∑b′∈B pit ((b′, θ1) |ht−1)
ut
(
ht−1, (b, θ1) , ht+1, . . . , ht+s
)
v˜t
(
ht−1, (β∗, θ1) , ht+1, . . . , hT
)
= ∑
b∈B
pit
(
(b, θ1) |ht−1
)
∑b′∈B pit ((b′, θ1) |ht−1)
vt
(
ht−1, (b, θ1) , ht+1, . . . , ht+s
)
By Lemma (4), there exists θ > 0 such that for θ1 < θ we have
Ut
(
ht−1, (β, θ1)
)
≥ Ut
(
(b, θ1) |ht−1, (β, θ1)
)
> Ut
((
β′′, θ′
) |ht−1, (β, θ1))
for all θ′ > θ1 and for all β′′ ∈ B. Therefore, IC constraints at nodes
(
ht−1, (b, θ1)
)
are satisfied
for all b ∈ B. From linearity of the objective function, IC constraints of (ht−1, (b, θ))-types are
also satisfied for all θ > θ1 and all b ∈ B. Therefore this perturbation preserves IC at period
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t. Furthermore, from the planner’s point of view the perturbation continuation utility at ht−1
remains unchanged. Therefore welfare is unchanged, while for agents with hyperbolic preferences
all IC constraints for period s ≤ t− 1 are satisfied. For histories hs  ht−1 for s > t, taking a convex
combination leaves incentives unchanged because the objective is linear. But C (u) = u−1 (u)
is strictly convex, so for ut
(
ht−1, (β, θ1)
)
> ut
(
ht−1, (β′, θ1)
)
and pit (·) having full support this
perturbation saves a strictly positive amount of resources—a contradiction. Hence, agents with
types
{(
ht−1, (θ1, β)
)
: β ∈ B} are bunched.
Part 2.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that for some ht−1 we have that
(
ht−1, (βt, θN)
)
-types for
all βt ∈ Bt share the same allocation. Then
Et
[
C′
(
ut+1
(
ht−1, (βt, θN) , (βt+1, θt+1)
))
δRtC′ (ut (ht−1, (βt, θN)))
|θN
]
= κ
for some constant κ > 0. Recalling that βM = 1, consider the following perturbation for the
allocation of type (βM, θN):
u˜t
(
ht−1, (βM, θN)
)
= ut
(
ht−1, (βM, θN)
)
− ε
u˜t+1
(
ht−1, (βm, θn) , (βt+1, θt+1)
)
= ut+1
(
ht−1, (βM, θN) , (βt+1, θt+1)
)
+
1
δ
ε
for ε > 0. Welfare of type
(
ht−1, (βM, θN)
)
is kept constant by such a change. Types
(
ht−1,
(
β j, θN
))
for β j < 1 dislike this perturbation, so it preserves IC. The marginal resource cost is
dE = −C′
(
ut
(
ht−1, (βM, θN)
))
ε+
1
Rt
Et
[
C′
(
ut+1
(
ht−1, (βM, θN) , (βt+1, θt+1)
))
|θN
] 1
δ
ε
=
[
1
δRt
Et
[
C′
(
ut+1
(
ht−1, (βM, θN) , (βt+1, θt+1)
))
|θN
]
− C′
(
ut
(
ht−1, (βM, θN)
))]
ε
= (κ − 1)C′
(
ut
(
ht−1, (βM, θN)
))
ε
For the original allocation to be optimal, we require dE ≥ 0 and thus κ ≥ 1.
Suppose further that κ > 1. Recall that βt ≤ 1 for all βt ∈ Bt and consider the following
62
perturbation to all types
(
ht−1, (βt, θN)
)
:
u˜t
(
ht−1, (βt, θN)
)
= ut
(
ht−1, (βt, θN)
)
+ ε
u˜t+1
(
ht−1, (βt, θN) , (βt+1, θt+1)
)
= ut+1
(
ht−1, (βt, θN) , (βt+1, θt+1)
)
− 1
δ
ε
Type
(
ht−1, (βM, θN)
)
is indifferent between the original allocation and the new one, while types(
ht−1, (βt, θN)
)
with βt < 1 strictly prefer the new allocation for ε > 0. Since no IC constraint for
types {θ1, θ2, . . . , θN−1} are binding with respect to θN-types, then the perturbation preserves IC
for ε > 0 small enough. The associated resource cost is
dE = (1− κ)C′
(
ut
(
ht−1, (βt, θN)
))
ε
But κ > 1, leading to a resource gain—a contradiction. This leaves us with the case when κ = 1.
Suppose that κ = 1 so that for agents bunched at θN the inverse Euler equation holds. By
Lemma 3 and θN-type agents are bunched, we have ut
(
ht−1, (βt, θN)
)
> ut
(
ht−1,
(
βt, θj
))
for all
j < N. Then consider the following perturbation:
u˜t
(
ht−1, (β1, θN)
)
= ut
(
ht−1, (β1, θN)
)
+ ε− ν
u˜t+1
(
ht−1, (β1, θN) , (βt+1, θt+1)
)
= ut+1
(
ht−1, (β1, θN) , (βt+1, θt+1)
)
− 1
δβ2
ε
From the point of view of β1-types the payoff change is
dU (β1) =
(
1− β1
β2
)
ε− ν
Since β1 < β2, we can choose ε > 0 and ν > 0 such that (1− β1/β2) ε = ν. All
(
ht−1, (β1, θN)
)
-
types are left indifferent by this perturbation. Furthermore, agents with type β > β1 dislike this
perturbation. Therefore, since other IC constraints with respect to type
(
ht−1, (β1, θN)
)
are slack,
the perturbation preserves IC. In terms of resources, however, we have
dE = C′
(
ut
(
ht−1, (β1, θN)
))
(ε− ν)− 1
Rt
Et
[
C′
(
ut+1
(
ht−1, (βM, θN) , (βt+1, θt+1)
))
|θN
] 1
δβ2
ε
= C′
(
ut
(
ht−1, (β1, θN)
))(β1
β2
− κ
β2
)
ε
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Since β2 ≤ 1, then for ε > 0 and ν > 0 we get dE < 0, so that the planner saves resources. Since
ut
(
ht−1, (βt, θN)
)
> ut
(
ht−1,
(
βt, θj
))
for all j < N, there exists ε > 0 small enough such that
redistributing these extra resources improves welfare—a contradiction..
B.3.4 Proof of Theorem 5
Part 1.
Proof. Fix a period t and a history ht−1. From Theorem 4, we know that there exists θ > 0 such
that all agents with a history in
{(
ht−1, (β, θ1)
)
: β ∈ B} for θ1 < θ are bunched at the same con-
tinuation allocation. In particular, those agents face the same inverse Euler equation distortion
∑
(βt+1,θt+1)∈B×Θ
γt+1 (βt+1) ρt+1 (θt+1|θ1)
[
C′
(
ut+1
(
ht−1, (β, θ1) , (βt+1, θt+1)
))
δRtC′ (ut (ht−1, (β, θ1)))
|θN
]
= κ
for all β ∈ B and for some constant κ > 0. The desired result holds if and only if κ ≥ 1. Assume
by way of contradiction that κ < 1. Then consider the following perturbation:
u˜t
(
ht−1, (β, θ1)
)
= ut
(
ht−1, (β, θ1)
)
− δε
u˜t+1
(
ht−1, (β, θ1) , (βt+1, θt+1)
)
= ut+1
(
ht−1, (β, θ1) , (βt+1, θt+1)
)
+ ε
for all (βt+1, θt+1) ∈ B × Θ. This perturbation keeps welfare constant, hence does not affect IC
at period s < t, when due to quasi-geometric discounting agents and the planner agree about
the intertemporal trade-off between periods t and t + 1. From Lemma 4, there exists θ > 0 such
that for θ1 < θ agents with histories in
{(
ht−1, (β, θ1)
)
: β ∈ B} have strictly slack IC constraints
with respect to any other agent not in this group. For ε > 0, agents with β ≤ 1 find themselves
weakly worse off under this perturbation, so the perturbation preserves incentive compatible. The
marginal resource cost is
dE = (κ − 1) δC′
(
ut
(
ht−1, (β, θ1)
))
ε
For ε > 0 and κ < 1 we get dE < 0, so the perturbation saves resources—a contradiction.
Part 2.
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Proof. For the first part, let
∑
(βt+1,θt+1)∈B×Θ
γt+1 (βt+1) ρt+1 (θt+1|θN)
[
C′
(
ut+1
(
ht−1, (βM, θN) , (βt+1, θt+1)
))
δRtC′ (ut (ht−1, (βM, θN)))
|θN
]
= κH
for some κH > 0. Assume by way of contradiction that κH < 1. Then consider the perturbation
u˜t
(
ht−1, (βM, θN)
)
= ut
(
ht−1, (βM, θN)
)
− δε
u˜t+1
(
ht−1, (βM, θN) , (βt+1, θt+1)
)
= ut+1
(
ht−1, (βM, θN) , (βt+1, θt+1)
)
+ ε
for all (βt+1, θt+1) ∈ B×Θ. Since βM = 1, this perturbation preserves IC for ε > 0. The marginal
resource cost is
dE = (κH − 1) δC′
(
ut
(
ht−1, (βM, θN)
))
ε
so for κH < 1 we have that dE < 0 whenever ε > 0, which saves a strict amount of resources—a
contradiction.
For the second part, note that from Lemma 6 and from Theorem 4 we have that there exists
θ < +∞ and β > 0 such that for θN > θ and β1 < β we have that agents with histories in{(
ht−1, (β, θ)
)
: β ∈ B, θ < θN
}
strictly prefer their own allocation to the allocation of any agent
with history
{(
ht−1, (β, θN)
)
: β ∈ B}. Furthermore, we have ut (ht−1, (β1, θN)) > ut (ht−1, (β, θ))
for all θ < θN and all β ∈ B by Lemma 6. Suppose now that
∑
(βt+1,θt+1)∈B×Θ
γt+1 (βt+1) ρt+1 (θt+1|θN)
[
C′
(
ut+1
(
ht−1, (β1, θN) , (βt+1, θt+1)
))
δRtC′ (ut (ht−1, (β1, θN)))
|θN
]
= κ˜H
for some κ˜H > 0. Assume by way of contradiction that κ˜H ≥ 1. Then consider the perturbation:
u˜t
(
ht−1, (β1, θN)
)
= ut
(
ht−1, (β1, θN)
)
+ β1δε+ ν
u˜t+1
(
ht−1, (β1, θN) , (βt+1, θt+1)
)
= ut+1
(
ht−1, (β1, θN) , (βt+1, θt+1)
)
− ε
u˜t
(
ht−1, (β, θ)
)
= u˜t
(
ht−1, (β, θ)
)
+ ν
for all (βt+1, θt+1) ∈ B × Θ and all (β, θ) 6= (β1, θN). For ε > 0 and ν > 0, this perturbation is
incentive compatible since agents with β ≥ β1 find it (weakly) less attractive. To keep welfare
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unchanged, we require
dW = pi
(
β1, θN |ht−1
)
(β1 − 1) δε+ ν = 0
so that ν = pi
(
β1, θN |ht−1
)
(1− β1) δε. The marginal resource cost is
dE =pi
(
β1, θN |ht−1
)
C′
(
ut
(
ht−1, (β1, θN)
))
δ (β1 − κ˜H) ε+ ν ∑
(β,θ)
pi
(
β, θ|ht−1
)
C′
(
ut
(
ht−1, (β, θ)
))
=pi
(
β1, θN |ht−1
)
δC′
(
ut
(
ht−1, (β1, θN)
))
(1− β1)
( β1 − κ˜H
1− β1
)
+ ∑
(β,θ)
pi
(
β, θ|ht−1
) C′ (ut (ht−1, (β, θ)))
C′
(
ut
(
ht−1, (β1, θN)
))
 ε
Since ut
(
ht−1, (β1, θN)
)
> ut
(
ht−1, (β, θ)
)
for θ < θN by Lemma 6, and clearly ut
(
ht−1, (β1, θN)
) ≥
ut
(
ht−1, (β, θN)
)
for all β ∈ B, then
∑
(β,θ)
pi
(
β, θ|ht−1
) C′ (ut (ht−1, (β, θ)))
C′ (ut (ht−1, (β1, θN)))
< 1
Since β1 < 1 ≤ κ˜H we conclude that dE < 0 for ε > 0, meaning that this perturbation saves a
strictly positive amount of resources—a contradiction.
C Details of numerical solution algorithm
We start by defining a general global non-linear maximization problem
max
x∈A
f (x)
for A ⊂ RK and f : RK → R where K ∈ N. We impose the following four regularity conditions,
which are satisfied for a large class of problems including the one we study:
Assumption 1. A = ∩i∈I Di where Di are convex sets, for some finite set I.
Assumption 2. f is concave and has a unique maximum at any set ∩j∈J Dj for J ⊂ I.
Assumption 3. There exists J∗ ⊂ I such that #J∗ < K and
arg max
x∈∩j∈J∗Dj
f (x) = arg max
x∈A
f (x)
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Assumption 4. For all J ⊂ I, there exists SJ ⊂ J such that #SJ < K− 1 and
arg max
x∈∩j∈SJ Dj
f (x) = arg max
x∈∩j∈J Dj
f (x)
Assumptions 1 is satisfied since all constraints in the re-stated planner’s problem (6) are either
linear or strictly convex. Assumption 2 holds because we seek the solution to a convex program.
Assumptions 3 and 4 are sufficient conditions for the LICQ to hold at the solution to the planner’s
problem. We check them numerically at each step in our routine. We then propose the following
numerical algorithm, which finds the smallest set of binding constraints at the optimum by loop-
ing through subsets of the set of global IC constraints and solving a sequence of relaxed problems:
1. Start with a set J0 ⊂ I such that #J0 ≤ K− 1
1.1 If #J0 = K− 1, then find J′0 ⊂ J0 that makes assumption 4 hold
1.2 Let J0 = J′0.
2. Solve for x (J0) = arg maxx∈∩j∈J0 f (x)
2.1 Let JD (J0) =
{
j ∈ J0 : x (J0\ {j}) ∈ ∩i∈J0 Di
}
be the set of slack constraints
2.2 If #JD (J0) = 0, let J′0 = J0
2.3 If #JD (J0) > 0:
i. Randomly select JD0 ⊂ JD (J0)
ii. Let J′0 = J0\JD0
2.4 Let JV (J′0) = {i ∈ I : x (J′0) /∈ Di}
2.5 Stop if #JV (J′0) = 0
3. Randomly select a subset JV0 ⊂ JV (J0) with K− #J′0 − 1 elements
4. Let J1 =
(
J0\JD0
) ∪ JV0 , then #J1 = K− 1
This algorithm iteratively finds the smallest set of binding constraints by adding a subset of vio-
lated but excluded constraints, and dropping a subset of redundant constraints in each iteration.
Adding a stochastic component to the constraint selection criterion avoids cycles and guarantees
that the algorithm finds the unique global optimum of the above program in finite time.
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Theorem 6. The algorithm converges with probability one to the global solution of the problem
plim x (Jn) = x∗
where x∗ = arg maxx∈A f (x).
Proof. The proof relies on the convexity of the problem as defined in Section A.2.1, and proceeds as
follows: First, note that f (x (Jn)) is monotonically decreasing, so it converges. Suppose the limit is
above f (x∗). Then since I is finite, from some sufficiently high n onward we have f (Jn) = f (Jn−1)
for all n. But #JV (Jn) > 0, so there is a positive probability that f (Jn+1) < f (Jn). Therefore, there
is zero probability of a limit above f (x∗). Thus plim f (Jn) = f (x∗). Since x∗ is unique and f is
continuous, we have plimx (Jn) = x∗.
Large-scale implementation. We implement our algorithm using the Interior Point Optimizer
(IPOPT) large-scale nonlinear optimization library in Python. To ensure stability of our solution,
we try different algorithms and starting points, and ensure that solutions coincide. We illustrate
the capabilities of our algorithm by solving a problem with (|Θ| , |B|) = (1000, 6), that is 6, 000
types, 18, 000 choice variables, and 35, 994, 001 constraints. Our algorithm solves this problem
in approximately two minutes on a 2013 MacBook Pro. We find that well below one percent of
constraints bind at the optimum, and that most binding constraints—though not all—are “local.”
Figure 7 plots optimal savings ratios, defined as s = (c2/R) / (c1 + c2/R), as a function of
individuals’ gross income (x-axis) and present bias level (colored lines). The numerical solution
extends in interesting ways our main theoretical results, which stated that the lowest ability types
were bunched and the highest types were separated (Theorem 1), and that optimal savings were
above the first-best rate at the bottom but below first-best at the top (Theorem 2). In the interme-
diate range, we observe bunching at higher than first-best savings rates up to some threshold, and
separation into savings rates ordered by β above this threshold. Notably, high-ability agents that
agree with the planner (β = 1) converge to the first-best savings rate, while those who disagree
(β < 1) save above their preferred rate but below the first-best.
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Figure 7. Optimal savings rates in a numerical illustration of the solution algorithm
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Note: Illustration of numerical algorithm solving a problem with (|Θ| , |B|) = (1000, 6) types, 18, 000 choice vari-
ables, and 35, 994, 001 constraints. Savings rate is defined as s = (c2/R) / (c1 + c2/R).
D Proof of Theorem 3 for the general problem
Part 1.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 1 and relies only on convexity of the set of IC
constraints when we rewrite the problem in terms of utility levels and preference wedges.
Part 2.
Proof. Note that since θ1 < θ < θ < θN we have v (θN , α) > v (θ1). Therefore, IC implies
u (θN , α) + αε (θN , α) > u (θ1) + αε (θ1)
In particular, for α = 0 we have u (θN , α) > u (θ, α′) for all (θ, α′). Assume by way of contradiction
that u (θN , α) = u (θN), v (θN , α) = v (θN) and a (θN , α) = a (θN) at the solution to the planner’s
problem. Then we have u (θN) > u (θ1). Let αmax = max {A} ≥ 0. If b′ (a (θN)) > p, then consider
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the following change to the allocation:
a˜ (θN , αmax) = α (θN) + ν
u˜ (θN , αmax) = u (θN)− αmaxν+ η
u˜ (θ, α) = u˜ (θ, α) + η
for all (θ, α) 6= (θN , αmax) . For ν > 0 this perturbation is incentive compatible since for α < αmax
the change in the deviation payoff into the allocation of (θN , αmax) is (α− αmax) ν < 0 and the
original allocation is incentive compatible. The marginal change in resources used is
dE =pi (θN , αmax)
[
−αmaxνC′ (u (θN))−
(
b′
(
ε−1 (ε (θN))
)
ε′ (ε−1 (ε (θN)))
− p
ε′ (ε−1 (ε (θN)))
)
ν
]
+ η∑
θ,α
pi (θ, α)C′ (u (θ, α))
If αmax = 0, then this yields a contradiction since for ν > 0 we can set η > 0 small enough to
increase welfare. For αmax > 0, the marginal change in the government’s objective is given by
dW = −pi (θN , αmax) λ (θN) αmaxν+ η
If η = pi (θN , αmax) λ (θN) αmaxν, then dW = 0 and the marginal change in resource cost is
dE
pi (θN , αmax) αmaxC′ (u (θN))
=ν
{
λ (θN)∑
θ,α
pi (θ, α)
C′ (u (θ, α))
C′ (u (θN))
− 1
}
− ν
αmaxC′ (u (θN))
(
b′
(
ε−1 (ε (θN))
)
ε′ (ε−1 (ε (θN)))
− p
ε′ (ε−1 (ε (θN)))
)
Since λ (θN) ≤ 1 and since C (·) is convex and u (θN) ≥ u (θ, α), then dE < 0 for ν > 0, a con-
tradiction. Therefore we must have b′ (a (θN)) ≤ p. In this case, we can construct an analogous
perturbation for αmin = min {A} ≤ 0. Hence, we conclude that b′ (a (θN)) = p. If αmax > 0, note
that the perturbation above also implies that dE < 0 since u (θN) > u (θ, α) for θ < θN , a contra-
diction. The case for αmin < 0 is analogous. This exhausts all possible cases, thus contradicting
the initial assumption that all agents in {(θN , α) : α ∈ A} receive the same allocation. We conclude
that θN-types are separated in the α-dimension.
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